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Daily Report
East Europe

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Albania: Illegal Communist Party Leaders Held on Remand

AU0603194296 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 5 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by Mentor Kikia: "Our Party Would Not Be Like Enver Hoxha's"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Tirana—"We would create a new-style communist party, not a Stalinist one." The founders of the Albanian Communist Party confessed the "political manifesto" of their still uncreated party. The four leaders, arrested a few days ago under the accusation of creating illegal parties and associations, faced the court yesterday. Tare Isufi (aged 73), Sami Meta (aged 62), Timoshenko Pekmezi (aged 54), and Kristaq Mosko (aged 45) appeared in court yesterday to hear the address of their new accommodation. Following their arrest on Friday [1 March] evening, the court met in session yesterday to reconsider the measures taken. The court confirmed the arrest of Meta, Pekmezi, and Mosko. These three will continue to be held in prison on remand until investigations are concluded. Isufi's advanced years obliged the court to send him home under house arrest. [passage omitted]

Albania: Constitutional Court To Consider Electoral Law

AU0603193296 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 6 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by Me.Ki., El.El.: "Constitutional Court Opens Its Doors to the Electoral Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The Constitutional Court is opening its doors to the Electoral Law. The court administration yesterday decided on 11 March for the consideration of the Electoral Law, which the Socialist Party's parliamentary group is seeking to have declared unconstitutional. The case will bring the Socialists back to the Constitutional Court, from which they departed with downcast heads only a short time ago.

The Socialist Party has based its case on three points. The Socialists asked for the law to be declared unconstitutional in a letter to Gjata on the basis of several irregularities in the conception of the law and the procedure for its approval. The PS first of all bases its suit on the fact that the Democratic Party did not accept the demands for changes to the law that issued from the round table of the 13 parties. They also object to the removal of the mandate of the "genocidal" deputies before the new parliament starts work. Under the law approved by the current parliament, all deputies enjoy the right to be considered deputies even after the dissolution of parliament, but this will not hold good for those deputies incriminated under the Genocide Law. This is strongly contested in the Socialists' suit lodged with the Constitutional Court, just as they also object to the president's right to determine constituency boundaries.

After their strong denunciation of the Genocide Law and of the dismissal of Zef Brozi, chairman of the Court of Cassation, the politicians of the largest opposition party were told in both cases by Rustem Gjata's court, "Everything was done on the basis of the Constitution."

Albania: National Bank To Issue New 1,000-Lek Note

AU0603141996 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On 15 March 1996, the Bank of Albania will put into circulation a new 1,000-lek bank note, printed in 1995. This bank note is a reprint of the 1992 model and is identical to it in size, paper type, design, and elements of protective colors and print, but it contains certain security features.

To familiarize the public with the security features used in this bank note, the Bank of Albania has published a booklet showing its main characteristics in detail.

Bulgaria: FRY Delegation Begins Economic Talks

AU0603134196 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Mixed Bulgarian-Yugoslav Commission for Trade and Economic Cooperation began its first session in Sofia this morning with short introductory speeches and the adoption of its rules of procedure. The commission set up working groups that will start work this afternoon in the fields of customs cooperation, commodity stocks, state reserves, economic cooperation and trade, transportation, communications, the energy sector, industry, construction, and technical and scientific cooperation.

The fifth bilateral business meeting also started this morning within the framework of the commission's session and under the aegis of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Yugoslav Economic Chamber.

The FRY official delegation is led by Jovan Zebic, FRY deputy prime minister and finance minister. This afternoon he will have successive meetings with Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov and Ministers Paparizov, Vuchev, and Kostov.

The Bulgarian delegation to the session is chaired by Doncho Konakchiev, deputy prime minister and minister of construction. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: BSP's Stoilov Discusses Belgrade Visit

AU0603192096 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 2 Mar 96 p 3

[Interview with Yanaki Stoilov, deputy chairman of Supreme Council of Bulgarian Socialist Party, by staff journalist Dora Chichkova; place and date not given: "Why Not a Balkan Club of Rome?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Chichkova] Is it not true that the BSP's [Bulgarian Socialist Party] interest in Yugoslavia is "outweighing" its Balkan policy? Your recent visit to the FRY with Aleksandur Lilov, director of the BSP Strategic Studies Center forms part of a series of visits, both already completed and forthcoming. Some people are looking for an ideological motivation in this high activity.

[Stoilov] It is true that the BSP is the most active factor in Bulgarian-Yugoslav contacts. If a political application can be found, it lies in the fact that socialist parties are in power in both countries that have common ideas about the need to develop relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. These relations can contribute to stimulating Balkan cooperation. I hope that the Bulgarian opposition will also finally realize this and overcome the distance separating them from Belgrade to seek suitable parties of their own there; otherwise, the opposition will not measure up to the processes under way in Yugoslavia, in which the whole of Europe is showing interest.

[Chichkova] How did you find Yugoslavia after the embargo?

[Stoilov] First and foremost, I was impressed by the fact that a sense of statehood has been preserved in the FRY. The institutions are functioning fully, there is good coordination between them, and the state is managing to regulate the processes. Their extremely sober attitude to privatization is worthy of note. They regard privatization as an opportunity to invest additional capital in the enterprises, most of all through joint investments.

The conclusion of the war creates conditions for economic and social stabilization. However, the peace process is as yet not fully established. Bosnia remains the most critical point. There are signs that future complications cannot be ruled out in the region torn by the recent conflicts. Despite the serious fate facing the Serb population outside its territory, the FRY supports peace and is quickly surmounting foreign isolation.

[Chichkova] What about the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], which invited you to visit Belgrade? As the ruling party, how has the lengthy conflict in the region affected it?

[Stoilov] The achievement of peace undoubtedly increases the SPS's authority and influence. It is impressive that in the last few months it has admitted about 35,000 new members, mainly young people. According to the leadership's figures, the SPS now has about half a million members. At its forthcoming congress the SDS will discuss a project called "Serbia 2000—Stepping into the New Century." This project will probably form the basis of its election campaign platform. Like us, the Serbian Socialists view Balkan cooperation in the context of European integration. I find noteworthy the way in which they are conducting a dialogue with West European socialist and social-democratic parties—with dignity and with the conviction that closer links are mutually beneficial.

[Chichkova] What are the prospects for Bulgarian-Yugoslav cooperation, given the well-known consequences of the embargo and certain historical accretions in our relations?

[Stoilov] Bulgaria has followed a consistent, balanced policy toward the Yugo-crisis, so it has retained good prospects for developing cooperation. The barriers of the past seem to have been overcome. It is not an exaggeration to say that never in the recent decades have such good opportunities existed for partnership at all levels and in all areas. Like us, our hosts were ready to regard the Bulgarian ethnic minority as a bridge for bringing the two nations closer together, not as a source of tension.

[Chichkova] Did you also discuss the possibilities for Bulgaria to participate in the postwar reconstruction of the region?

[Stoilov] This is mainly a question for the institutions of state, but we did not omit the issue. In this context, we also have to maintain an active dialogue with the European institutions. Bilateral contacts deserve just as much attention, such as in the fields of building new routes and joint communications, relaxing customs duties and regulations, and planning joint projects financed with foreign participation.

[Chichkova] The idea broached by the BSP Strategic Studies Center of a Balkan club was also discussed in Belgrade. Can you tell us any more about it?

[Stoilov] This club may include as members authoritative scientists, politicians, and businessmen, without any ideological or professional restrictions. The aim is not merely to hold discussions, but also to propose ideas and projects for developing the Balkan region. If these proposals are accompanied by well-founded arguments and are practicable, they can be submitted to the governments, public opinion, and the political parties. Without being naive about the possibilities or overambitious, the idea can be regarded as a kind of analogy to the Club of Rome. It is not a question of the Balkans shutting themselves off, but of providing an opportunity for them to develop in the new global processes. This can make the Balkan states influential and attractive partners, including in the process of European integration.

[Chichkova] Do people in Serbia know about the analyses published by the Strategic Studies Center?

[Stoilov] We talked to many Serbian scientists and academics. Some of them were informed about our analyses, while others had an opportunity to receive them now. In Serbia in-depth studies have been completed in Balkan problems. In Belgrade the first public consultations were held on forming the club, although the discussions are also being held with academics from other countries. I believe that if representatives of a number of Balkan countries make a start on implementing the idea, both the number of participants and the topics discussed may increase. I am convinced that cooperation between the Balkan countries may increase the role of the Balkans in deciding their own fate.

Bulgaria: Bank States Videnov Not Shareholder

AU0603184796 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Zhan Videnov, his family, and members of the government own no shares and hold no deposits in the Bulgarian Agricultural and Industrial Bank [BAIB], the bank's press service has announced in a fax. This declaration was prompted by statements made by representatives of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] leadership. The attempts by political leaders of various parties to discredit the BAIB's good name are not only pathetic and ridiculous, but also actionable in law, the fax states.

The BAIB believes that the crisis in the banking sector is largely due to irresponsible statements and actions by those who are urging that the National Assembly clarifies the situation by appointing a commission of inquiry.

Czech Republic: 'Secret' Klaus, Lux Meeting Averts Crisis

AU0603211996 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 5 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by "(km)": "A Secret Meeting Between Klaus and Lux Left Holan in His Post"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The bickering at the beginning of the year over the lucrative Army tender for the staff information system and the transparency of the defense department's economic management nearly turned into a government crisis.

That is, in January, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] tried to dismiss Vilem Holan (Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL]) from his post as defense minister; the KDU-CSL wanted, in turn, to dismiss First Deputy Minister Petr Necas, who is the ODS's most senior representative in the department.

Impending collapse was eventually averted by a secret meeting between the leaders of the two parties, Vaclav Klaus and Josef Lux, which was held during the morning of 5 January. Representatives of the coalition parties had denied this at the time.

"Peace was concluded at this meeting," said a source close to the People's Party leadership yesterday. His statement was subsequently confirmed by a leading representative of the ODS. Neither of them wanted to be named, however, because a strict embargo is being imposed within the two parties on information on this meeting. ODS Spokeswoman Jana Petrova refused to comment; she said she was on vacation at this time. "If this meeting did take place, only its participants should report on it," she said. However, Klaus is on an official visit abroad, and Lux, according to his colleagues, is not interested in commenting on the situation.

It is assumed that the ODS backed down from its intention after the KDU-CSL reminded it that it was Deputy Minister Necas who had pressed for the cancellation of the Army tender for a staff information system. Thanks to this intervention, the ODS allegedly was supposed to have obtained a sponsorial donation from the E.D.S. company, which was unsuccessful in the tender because it came in second.

Prime Minister Klaus decided to raise the issue of the Defense Ministry's leadership after he became aware of the bitter quarrels between Minister Holan and Deputy Minister Necas. These came to a head on 2 January when Holan asked Necas not to attend a meeting with select ministers regarding the projects for the Army's development and Army tenders. Necas eventually attended this important meeting following the direct intervention of the prime minister.

The ministers rejected all of Holan's objectives at this meeting. "Then there was some playing for time to see who would prevail, Holan or Necas," said an unnamed Army official. "The tension was relieved only after a meeting between the most senior representatives of the two parties."

Czech Republic: Ministry Confirms Army Tender Bids Altered

AU0603210196 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 4 Mar 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Jaroslav Kmenta: "Someone Altered the Prices in the Army Tender"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—During the selection procedure for the Army information system valued at several billion korunas [Kc], whose outcome was eventually canceled because of discrepancies, someone rearranged the prices of the computer systems put forward.

It is apparent from the documents on the outcome of the tender that someone in the 17-member selection commission tampered with the prices offered the moment it was clear that the U.S. Unisys company would win and "lowered" the bid of one of the competing companies by almost Kc200 million.

Following this alteration, the victorious Unisys company was listed as the firm offering the hardware at the highest possible price, despite the fact that, in reality, the most expensive company was Digital Equipment, which finished in third place overall.

"When Unisys's victory was already clear, the best possible ground was supposed to have been prepared so that the tender could be canceled. The argument that the most expensive firm won could have helped," claims one of the military officials who was involved in preparing the selection procedure.

The tender was affected by the simple switching of digits in the hundreds-of-millions columns in the price of the project submitted by Digita Equipment. This company entered the tender with the highest price, Kc3,856,220,713. In its official announcement, made on 17 November of last year, of the selection of the most suitable bid, however, the Army cited the altered figure of Kc3,658,220,713. The interchanging of the digits 8 and 6 meant that the bid from the Unisys company, whose information system costs Kc3,728,998,528, was listed in the Army's official document as the most expensive.

The Defense Ministry confirmed last week that the figures had been switched but said that it was unintentional. "The switch occurred as a result of a technical error. The selection commission, however, made its calculations with the correct price, and, therefore, this error had no influence on its evaluation," stated the Defense Ministry's press department.

Digital Equipment's senior accountant, Aloiz Baranek, has also denied that his company would be interested in the mistake. "It was obviously a typing error," he declared.

This mistake was not even uncovered by the Ministry for Economic Competition because the Army did not provide Belehradek's office—for its recent investigation—with the document from the opening of the bids, which contained the original price offered by Digital Equipment. Belehradek's office is planning to impose a fine on the Army because of this.

Petr Necas, first deputy defense minister and a Civic Democratic Party [ODS] member of parliament, and the E.D.S. company, which came second in the competition, strived in particular for the cancellation of the tender. Necas even intervened directly to cancel the tender by writing an official letter to Defense Minister Vilem Holan several days after the selection commission had named Unisys the winner.

The ODS and E.D.S. deny, however, that they would somehow have joined their efforts to cancel the tender. "We are not a sponsor of the ODS," claims Karel Visnak, the E.D.S. director.

Some Defense Ministry representatives also have information pointing to corruption. The authorities that otherwise cooperate closely with the police in investigating serious crimes are now investigating a suspicion of bribery.

Czech Republic: Holan Weighs Air Force Revitalization

AU0603192896 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 5 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by "(fp)": "Holan Is Inclining Toward U.S. Fighters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—"If we say we do not want to endanger the alliance by our entry into NATO, our pilots also have to be prepared." This statement was made by Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan after his talks with his U.S. counterpart, William Perry.

In his view, the information from his meeting with Perry has further "elaborated the alternatives on offer" and may help the government make a faster decision on revitalizing the Air Force. Of the four options proposed by the Czech-U.S. expert commission, only two remain following the rejection of the modernization of the MiG's and a five-year deferral of the decision: the purchase or, conceivably, the leasing of older U.S. F-16's or the purchase of completely new aircraft. Following his return from the United States, however, Holan was reserved about the allegedly very lucrative offer from the Swedish Saab company to supply seven new Gripen fighters. "This reminds me of the saying 'Better an egg today than a hen tomorrow,'" said the minister, adding that the submission of ever newer suggestions is delaying the actual decision. "Sometimes the loss caused by deferring something is greater than by not making the absolutely optimum choice," he added.

Czech Republic: New Aircraft for Air Force Considered

96CH0052A Prague RESPEKT in Czech 11 Feb 96 p 4

[Article by Jaroslav Spurny: "U.S. Aircraft for Czech Lads"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Perhaps within two weeks the government will decide what kind of aircraft equipment will be used in the Czech Air Force. A mixed Czech-U.S. group of experts, known under the working title of R-Defense, favored a plan calling for the gradual acquisition of 24 older F-16 type-A aircraft from the arsenal of the U.S. Army. The first eight aircraft will be delivered in accordance with a leasing arrangement for 2 billion korunas, to be paid off within three years. This did not involve only negotiating with the Americans; the decision by the commission was based also on conversations with Polish and Hungarian specialists: Those armies are embarking on the same road upon which the Czech Ministry of Defense is preparing to embark, and Central Europe will have a compatible air force.

And so, a year and a half later the Holan ministry is returning to the variation that was introduced by Antonin Baudys. At that time, the aircraft involved were to be F-16's sidelined by the Belgian Army. But the decision from the fall of 1994 was not based on any strategic plans, and the Czech Army was late in finding out that, at that time, the U.S. embargo on the delivery of key military technology to countries of former East Europe was still in effect. Negotiations involving any kind of business transactions were practically never begun.

Some two years ago, MiG-29 fighter aircraft were removed from the game, despite the fact that Czech pilots valued them. Actually, the Czech Army owned only 10 such aircraft, and only two of them were more or less operational. To continue to rely on Russian aircraft was, moreover, politically untenable. It would signify continued collaboration with Russian military specialists and possible complications involving entry into NATO. In this case, there were also problems involving mechanics—more serious repairs were performed in Russia and in Ukraine and military pilots reportedly had to bribe mechanics there out of their own pockets in order for them to do anything at all.

It would seem that the idea of modernizing MiG-21 fighter planes had been definitively forgotten. Although the Army had announced a contest regarding this topic some time ago—a contest that was won by the Malesice Aircraft Repair Facilities, the commission paid no attention to this fact. According to the commissioners, the flight capabilities of an obsolete fighter plane cannot be improved and the aircraft cannot be upgraded to the highest combat category because it would not receive key weapons systems and the most modern electronics equipment.

Even the French firm Dassault remained out of the running. A year ago it had offered our Army six of the most modern Mirage aircraft "with highly advantageous payment conditions." Later, it was to deliver another six aircraft at least, but the latter were to be sold at prices customary in the West. The amount of the total cost is being kept secret both by the Army and also by local commercial representatives of French enterprises. In the end, not even the variation calling for equipping our Air Force only with lighter L-159 fighter aircraft of local manufacture (the contract was signed by the government as far back as a year ago) passed muster.

The decision to purchase the F-16's will definitely be welcomed by the supporters of our membership in NATO, although, in view of what is happening at the Ministry of Defense, a celebration would seem somewhat premature. Thus far, Minister Holan has not submitted a plan for rearmament to the government based on security risks and reflecting the strategy of defense. In other words, the ministry does not have a government-supported program that would, for example, list the cost of the acquisition, the number of aircraft involved, and the type of aircraft we shall need.

Irrespective of how necessary it may be, the acquisition of U.S. aircraft will have to be supported by additional investments. The retraining of pilots will probably be the least expensive. In view of the difference in design between the F-16 and Russian aircraft, it will be necessary even to rebuild the system of air traffic control: The cost of this project is three times higher than the cost of the aircraft themselves. The Army lacks money and is reworking the modernization plan through the year 2005 and actually does not know what it will be able to invest in. The conditions of the contract for delivery of U.S. aircraft will still be further refined by the Ministry of Defense, together with the Pentagon, and it is not completely out of the question to say that they may not come to an agreement. The final verdict will be pronounced by the Klaus cabinet. In view of all of the above-mentioned problems, it cannot be predicted with 100-percent certainty that it will approve the decision by the Czech-U.S. commission in the near future.

Slovakia: Article Examines Outcome of Primakov Visit

AU0603161996 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 2 Mar 96 p 9

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "With or Without Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 24-hour visit to Bratislava by Yevgeniy Primakov, the head of Russian diplomacy, has not brought anything new—at least from the outside and at first sight. Each of the parties presented its views on the key issue of contemporary Europe—the expansion of NATO—from the point of view of different reflections on state security. This did not at all prevent the two foreign ministers from emphasizing the need to improve mutual relations in all areas.

In this context, however, Primakov dropped a word as though by chance to the effect that Russia is Slovakia's main supplier of strategic raw material, which could be seen as a warning. At the same time, he tried to play this down by pointing out the traditional values in Slovak-Russian relations and making a verbal promise that Moscow will do everything in its power to remove the imbalance in mutual trade.

Regarding the entry of Slovakia and Russia's other former allies into the Atlantic Alliance, Primakov confirmed that Moscow does not have the right of veto, a fact that was also observed by his host, Juraj Schenk, but he also noted: "NATO comes and goes but nations are here to stay."

Russian diplomacy is trying to drive a wedge between the Alliance's present members and the new aspirants by emphasizing the consensus of Russian political forces in the matter of opposition to the expansion of the Alliance and by stressing the need to create a new security structure in Europe that would not exclude anyone. In this context, it quietly indicates that the membership hopefuls may not obtain the approval of the present members, which is a condition for membership. It even works on this in practice. The future will show how successful this work is.

The defense of the Slovak position regarding NATO entry must be praised given that it might be suspected of wanting the opposite. Bratislava, like all Alliance members and membership hopefuls, is not interested in pushing Moscow to the periphery of Europe as suggested by the Russian guest. Nevertheless, a mutually acceptable model of security cooperation for the 21st century must be fervently sought. This will be the main task for the upcoming period of stabilization of the political surface rippled by presidential elections in Russia and the United States.

Russia, as a Eurasian country, must first find its own place, achieve stability on the declared foundations, and rid itself of the vestiges of antiquated stereotypes of thinking and acting. Moscow has been an ally of the West before, true, under different historical circumstances. It would do no harm, however, to check this barrel, too, although today the risks come from elsewhere.

Primakov is a realist and, because of his earlier position as head of the intelligence service, he is well informed about the possibilities of Russia and of the others. His main job, one he has been given by Boris Yeltsin, is not only to make noise around the expansion of NATO for election purposes, but also to use all available means to stop or at least slow down this process.

He found only that ears were open to his arguments in Slovakia. It seems that he has not yet convinced anyone.

Slovakia: 'Prerequisite' for Kohl-Meciar Meeting Viewed

AU0603133696 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 5 Mar 96 p 9

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "Invitation to Bonn With One Condition Attached"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The verbal exchanges of fire over Deputy Prime Minister Katarina Tothova's alleged or real efforts to obtain during her recent visit to Bonn an official invitation for Vladimir Meciar to the chancellor's bungalow on the banks of the Rhine serve as another evidence of the peculiar diplomacy in our part of the world. And, once again, the blame is being attached to journalists, this time German ones from the DPA agency, who, according to official Slovak sources, distorted information they obtained.

I do not want in the least to defend my colleagues. They can err, like all human beings.

According to well-informed sources in Bonn (that is, not just according to the DPA agency), an unavoidable prerequisite for a Kohl-Meciar meeting is one condition—the proper investigation of all circumstances of Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction to Austria. Whether anyone likes it or not, Bonn evidently proceeds in this matter in a coordinated fashion with other EU members, as can be seen from the number of invitations for the Slovak prime minister to Germany's EU partner countries. The Slovak authorities can scream and complain as much as they can. At present, they have to fight their battle in the Kovac Jr. affair on several fronts. One can hardly expect respectable world statesmen to send to Bratislava an official invitation for the government chief of a state, whose secret service, including its director, was directly accused, in the verdict of the independent court of a democratic country, of having kidnapped a citizen of its own country. Not to mention the fact that this same government did nothing to help its own citizen, affected in this way, even though this would have been its obligation under the Constitution and the laws of the country.

In short, before the background of the whole operation is sufficiently clarified, which also implies punishment of those responsible for it, we can expect that, multilateral forums apart, Vladimir Meciar will pay official visits only to the Balkans or the Commonwealth of Independent States republics, plus, possibly, to some Asian or Latin American countries. Even his forthcoming visit to Japan is not an official visit, but only a working one. The prime minister will officially visit Malaysia and Singapore.

Slovakia: SNS Figures on 'Protection of the Republic' Bill

AU0603202696 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 5 Mar 96 p 5

[Report by Lubos Jurina: "Slovak National Party Is Satisfied With Justice Ministry's Draft; Protection of the Republic—Penal Code Amendment Could Be on Agenda of the March National Council of the Slovak Republic Meeting"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak Ministry of Justice has drafted an amendment to the Penal Code that will modify its provisions on crimes against the foundations and the security of the republic. While the text of the draft is not officially known, the satisfaction with which it has been received by the Slovak National Party [SNS] suggests a great deal. Last spring the SNS initiated a discussion on the need to reinforce the protection of the young Slovak Republic. "We have no objections of principle to the Justice Ministry's draft, we only differ on some relatively minor details," SNS Deputy Chairwoman Anna Malikova told NARODNA OBRODA.

The SNS assumes that the proposed amendment will be discussed by the National Council of the Slovak Republic at its March meeting.

Punishment for Even Unrealized Intentions

The SNS is pushing for more rigid sentences for participation in operations aimed at subverting the republic. Under the currently valid Article 92 of the Penal Code, everyone who participates in violent actions against the republic and its agencies with the intention of subverting its constitutional system, territorial integrity, and defense capability, or with the intention of destroying its independence, faces a prison term of up to 12 years. The sentence increases (up to capital punishment) if the perpetrator participates in these actions as a member of an organized group, if several persons are injured, if someone dies, or if large-scale damage is caused.

In its draft the SNS also demands that activities that represent a potential threat to the Slovak Republic be punished. It proposes a prison term of one to five years for participants in actions directed against the Slovak Republic. It demands even higher sentences—8 to 12 years of deprivation of freedom—for everyone "acting in a manner that can lead to violent actions against the Slovak Republic or its agencies."

"The currently valid Penal Code metes out punishment only when something happens, when an operation was carried out. Besides, it provides only for the punishment of a direct participant. He who stands in the background, who organizes, prepares, and financially supports actions that can, in the final analysis, result in the republic and its constitutional system being subverted, remains unpunished," Anna Malikova explains. This is also her reply to critics of the SNS draft who argue that today's Penal Code sufficiently protects the republic.

"The passage of a law, under which people will land in prison for 12 years even if their offense does not even reach the stage of an attempt, will return Slovakia to the year 1950. Its practical application will unequivocally mean political trials," Democratic Union Deputy Chairman Roman Kovac told the daily PRAVDA.

Article for Negative Reports

The drafting of a law on the protection of the republic (gradually, it evolved into a Penal Code amendment] was heralded by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar at a rally in Prievidza in November 1995. According to PRAVDA, he explained the need for it with the words: "Furthermore, we assume a situation when matters will be presented abroad differently than at home, when our republic will be portrayed as a chaotic state, which we cannot tolerate.... The demand is therefore fully justified that a draft law on the protection of the republic be submitted in the nearest future as an institute [institut] of protection against subversion and against attempts to attack and defame the activity of constitutional officials."

Vladimir Meciar's above words epitomize the purpose of a new article, which is denoted in the SNS draft as Article 108 and known in the public as "muzzle for opposition politicians and journalists." Under this article, "he who disseminates or permits on the territory of the Slovak Republic or abroad the dissemination of false reports or consciously untrue information about the Slovak Republic that can imperil its security or damage its interests at home or abroad, will be deprived of freedom for one to five years."

The SNS makes no secret of the political context of its draft. It justifies it with the "many false reports and unfounded attacks on the young Slovak Republic that grossly damage its good name and vitally important interests (also economic ones), particularly abroad."

According to SNS Deputy Jozef Prokes, "perceiving democracy as being without limits, our citizens are making themselves guilty of certain deeds. At the moment, the state does not avail itself of the possibility of real protection against disinformation and statements made abroad that are directed against the Slovak Republic. As a matter of fact, a political party or the government can only initiate criminal prosecution, the assessment rests with an independent court. Besides, every individual has the possibility to appeal to international courts," Jozef Prokes told NARODNA OBRODA.

Slovakia: SNS Says Kovac 'Unacceptable' as President

AU0703112196 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 5 Mar 96 p 2

[Unattributed report: "SNS Exceptions to the Work of the President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava (SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA)—The Slovak National Party [SNS] statement on the 3d anniversary of Michal Kovac's presidency of the Slovak Republic says, among other things, that the ratio between the hopes attached to the head of state at his inauguration and the eventual disappointment is too great for the SNS to be able to enter even a little something in the commendatory column of Michal Kovac as president of the Slovak Republic.

Our critical view is directed toward the systemic and specific steps of the president. Unfortunately, he did not fulfill even the basic systemic criterion of a non-partisan president, particularly in his relation toward the individual political parties. Similarly, the monochromatic composition of the group of Castle advisers marks his attitude toward the pro-national parties of the government coalition. Michal Kovac failed systemically also in his memorable state of society speech in the National Council of the Slovak Republic in March 1994, in which he released an avalanche that caused a crisis and early parliamentary elections, whose result bore witness to his professional and personal failure. There have been many professional faux pas in the work of the Slovak president, which have no equal among his sovereign colleagues abroad. Based on these facts, the SNS was forced, in accordance with Article 106 of Chapter 6 of the Slovak Constitution, to come up with an initiative to establish a special commission to investigate the activities of the president. Although the SNS reconsidered its proposal in an accommodating spirit, aimed at relaxing the tension, the major objections to the systemic work of the president say it all. It is sad that the head of the state has used his position to cover up criminals in the "Technopol" affair, even though it concerns his son. From this vantage point, the position of Michal Kovac Sr., in the highest office in the state appears absolutely unacceptable.

Slovakia: Pittner on Possible 'Illegal' SIS Actions

AU0703105396 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 28 Feb 96 pp 1, 3

[Report on interview with KDH Deputy Ladislav Pittner, former Slovak interior minister, by Julius Gembicky; place and date not given: "L. Pittner: The Dead-Bug Position of the SIS Is Unsustainable—Meciar Should Make a Political Decision"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The activities of the Slovak Information Service (SIS), especially after the abduction of the president's son to Austria, have attracted increased attention from the Slovak and unfortunately also the international public. Suspicion that its members participated in the scandalous affair have resulted in concerns about a possible government crisis.

According to the statement by Ladislav Pittner, deputy for the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] and former interior minister, who interpellated the Slovak prime minister in the parliament regarding connections with SIS activities, it is unimaginable that under these circumstances the director of secret services in a normal democratic country would not resign. The lackadaisical attitude of the members of the Special Supervisory Body [OKO] was described in this context as incomprehensible, for Deputy Frantisek Gaulieder (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) had to ask them in person to go and take care of their duties. "If even that body found it unnecessary to deal with various pieces of information, with both indirect and direct accusations against the SIS, it is something abnormal for a normally functioning society. Following the announcement of the verdict of the Upper Provincial Court in Vienna, the dead-bug position is unsustainable. It is high time to make the appropriate political decisions, which the prime minister must make sooner or later."

To NARODNA OBRODA's question as to whether it is usual in the world of secret services to have a public relations department, Pittner only observed laconically that according to Law 46/93 on the SIS, public relations should be the business of the director. If he seeks the support of the department for his outside comments, it testifies to his lack of self-confidence.

Regarding the information that SIS Director Lexa issued an order to amend the law on the SIS, which would enable the SIS to establish a department for special crimes investigation, Pittner said that the SIS could use it to investigate deeds falling under the first chapter of the Criminal Code, or those that could be assessed according to the so-called law on the protection of the Republic, currently in the works, or according to the amendment to the Criminal Code. It would concern the most serious crimes. These would be the crime of espionage, for instance, endangering the state or work secrets, or undermining the foundations of the Republic, which used to be investigated by State Security [StB] under the former regime. The fact that not only the search and information activities were concentrated in the StB, but also the investigation of whatever the search section discovered, led to forcing confessions from the suspects by illegal means or provocation. The subsequent investigation only confirmed the results determined by another StB section.

Therefore, after November 1989 the activities of the secret service were pared back to the basic operations according to the law on the SIS, Pittner emphasized. That is the collection, analysis, evaluation, and distribution of obtained information. At the same time these services—also in the Slovak Republic—were stripped of the power to investigate. "Even if it is an autonomous and legally objectivized delimitation of the operation of the present Investigation Office, which is a part of the Interior Ministry, a certain risk exists. It would be optimal if the institution of investigating judges were established in the Slovak Republic, so the criminal investigators would be completely outside the information and police corps. The last vestige of the former regime is the Prosecutor General's Office still working on the monocratic principle." According to the former interior minister, it should be replaced as soon as possible by a state attorney's office, which would be a part of the Justice Ministry. "The most recent affairs prove that the public is anxious about the activity of the Prosecutor's Office."

To the question as to where he gets information on SIS activities that is so reliable that interpellations can be based on it, Pittner admitted to SIS sources, because the secret service employees themselves are concerned about the orientation of the SIS, which they, too, consider illegal. This also is the source of the information on SIS intentions to gain the protection of constitutional officials as one of its powers. This idea of the SIS leadership again corresponds to the model of the former regime, when it was in the power of the StB. It was not as much the physical protection of the political and constitutional officials as their intelligence control. So is it again a matter of control over the coalition and opposition representatives when they endeavor to gain control over the Office for the Protection of Constitutional Officials? asked the Christian Democratic Movement deputy rhetorically.

In reply to a question concerning the source of information on the illegal SIS wiretapping of telephones at the secretariats of two opposition parties, and whether the Christian Democratic Movement is among them, Pittner replied that the source again is the SIS. Although approval by the court or the prosecutor is required for any wiretapping, this is dodged by tinkering with the telephone numbers. In the SIS application the last number is allegedly always different from that of the political party secretariat. If it is discovered, the entire affair can be covered up as an oversight. According to the same source the SIS has allegedly obtained enough bugging devices so as not to have to depend on borrowing from police units, which requires approval from a prosecutor or judge. We have information that the SIS was also bugging without applying for this legally necessary approval. The SIS was even interested in acquiring special equipment for radiocommunications with coding devices, and also a lie detector. In any case, control over the funding for such expensive equipment should be the exclusive responsibility of the OKO.

In the reply to yet another question, Pittner touched on the sensitive information concerning alleged preparations for the establishment of an independent section for monitoring the activity of churches, within the framework of the SIS counterespionage utilizing the reactivated agency network of the former StB. "This information is very dangerous. If it is confirmed that former StB officer T. was recruited for this work, no doubts would remain. The remarkable case of Deacon Jan Balazs, or that of Bishop Balaz in connection with the sale of a painting and the peculiar buyer with no real name or correct address, testify that following the public speech by Bishop Balaz on the domestic political development in Slovakia, the state power reassessed its relation to the church through the view of former StB agents, who are becoming at home in the SIS. If this is confirmed, it will be one more reason for I. Lexa to resign as the head of the SIS."

Slovakia: Commentary Considers Meciar's Privatization Policy

AU0603140396 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 4 Mar 96 p 9

[Commentary by Eduard Zitnansky: "Employee Joint Stock Companies Fulfilled Their Electoral Role; Political Background of the Economy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Privatization in Slovakia is no longer feigning anything. It makes no bones about whom it serves. Direct sales of property and shares from the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic (FNM) portfolio defy the principles of competition. They are only a form of shifting economic power.

In its policy statement at the beginning of 1995, the government declared that "to make the process of privatization more acceptable socially and in the interest of establishing a participatory economy, it will enforce employees' participation in the privatization of companies in which they work." The government pledged to enforce something that, already at the time of drafting the policy statement, it was unable to influence. Privatization is in the hands of the FNM.

Last fall Parliament approved a law that laid down the obligation to establish conditions for employees' participation in privatization. At the last meeting of Parliament in 1995, deputies approved an amendment that waters down this obligation.

National Council of the Slovak Republic Deputy Mikulas Dzurinda tried to find out in how many cases employees participated in the privatization of companies since fall 1995. In vain. He ran up against the FNM's unwillingness, to say the least. It is paradoxical that it is the economic expert of a right-wing party who is beginning to defend employees' interests and is clashing in the process with the economic expert of a workers party. To what the right-wing economist objects most of all, however, is the discrepancy between declaration of intent and reality. Employees' joint stock companies remained confined to fiery campaign speeches, they have fulfilled their electoral role. Employees of Biotika Slovenska Lupca have convinced themselves of this as well. Last Thursday [29 February], after a long time, the FNM decided to sell 40.6 percent of the shares of this pharmaceuticals company—quite differently than the employees had expected. Another firm was given preference over the employees' joint stock company.

Privatization breeds discontent, no matter how it is implemented. Those who fail in competition are bound to be discontented. It is a different matter, however, when only those are satisfied who acquired property. Privatization has become an instrument for satisfying personal ambitions and filling bank accounts. Recently the FNM sold the shares of Turcianske Papierne [Turcianske Paper Mill]. The firm that acquired them sold them further in no time—but for three times the price. The net profit from this operation was almost 35 million korunas. No one violated the law in this case, a few people just became rich.

Privatization is always about asserting interests. As long as these are the economic interests of individuals and groups, there is no reason to become excited. As soon as political pressures become involved in privatization, the change in proprietary relations ceases to be the only issue. The discussion started last week about privatizing Slavosovske Papierne [Slavosovce Paper Mill]. Because the company is indebted, it can be had for 1 koruna. In the background of the discussions about the sale of this loss-making firm are considerations about the possibility of manufacturing newsprint there, that is, paper on which newspapers are printed. The price of newsprint can ruin a newspaper. The price of newsprint from a firm that must invest more than 1 billion korunas in technology cannot be lower than the price of imported newsprint. And governments always manage to find ways of limiting imports.

Yet another deadline announced for the privatization of Slovak financial institutions expired last week. On the first day in March, new owners did not come into any of the four institutions to be privatized. The FNM is prepared to decide, but it has not yet received the concept. The National Bank of Slovakia has not received any proposal. The only person who keeps talking about the privatization of banks as though it were a fait accompli is Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. On Friday he announced that the decision has been made about all the fundamental issues concerning the privatization of Slovak financial institutions. However, after the two deadlines set by him previously [mid-February and end of February] expired, this time he did not set a new deadline. The approval of privatization projects is supposedly about to be finalized.

To this day, the privatization of banks has not been discussed in the economic centers that are to decide on it, that is, in the National Bank of Slovakia and in the FNM. Hence, the decision on it was made elsewhere. One can only guess where.

Slovakia: Coexistence Deputy on 'Pitfalls' of Language Law

96CH0051A Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 29 Jan 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Edit Bauer, deputy of the Coexistence Party, by Frantisek Buda; place and date not given: "The Language Law Has Many Pitfalls"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Buda] As of the new year, Slovakia has a law on the state language. Signals received from southern Slovakia indicate that, in practice, nothing has changed, because the Hungarian language continues to be used not only in households, schools, or on the street, but also in official locations and in stores. Do you have any different experiences in this regard, in other words, any negative experiences?

[Bauer] It is at present difficult to respond to this question by saying yes or no because thus far the implementing regulations, which are to be worked out by each ministry, have not yet been adopted nor have they taken effect. Nevertheless, we have already collected some negative indications; for example, at some post offices telegrams written in Hungarian were not accepted, which is absurd because, on that basis, it would be possible to prohibit even telephone conversations in any other language but the Slovak language. Some directors of school administrations, on the other hand, instructed schools in which the language of instruction is Hungarian to have their teachers hold meetings only using the Slovak language. However, the unfavorable influences will only be revealed in their full nakedness after the publication of the above-mentioned regulations and after 1 January 1997, when the application of sanction measures will become effective.

[Buda] But in the dual-language regions and in life in general proven humanitarian practices have been in effect for decades. It is hardly likely to expect that a clerk who, until 31 December 1995, communicated with Hungarian citizens normally in the Hungarian language will be speaking only Slovak overnight.

[Bauer] Of course, then it becomes necessary to pose the question as to what this law is good for—a law that is in conflict with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic as well as with humanitarian principles. For example, a civilian marriage performed in the Hungarian language is currently in conflict with the law on the state language because it involves an act by a public legal organ, something that is permitted only to be performed in the Slovak language. There are many similar pitfalls in this law.

I would also like to recall the case of an 80-year-old man from the okres of rural Kosice who addressed a letter in the Hungarian language to the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic having to do with the rehabilitation process. He received a rude response in which the ministry arrogantly wrote him that he should first have his letter translated into the Slovak language and then turn to the central authorities. I believe that it would hardly throw an institution to the ground if it would have the letter from a citizen, whom it is supposed to serve, translated, and the writer would then be satisfied.

[Buda] In some communities that have a Hungarian majority in their populations they have adopted their own generally binding regulations according to which, on their territory, as well as elsewhere, it is possible to use even the Hungarian language in contacts with officialdom. Is this not practically unnecessary, particularly because the Hungarian language is used for communicating in the majority of cases anyway?

[Bauer] These regulations are being asserted in an effort to overcome the conflicts that have arisen following adoption of the law on the state language. Article 34 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic says that members of minority nationalities are guaranteed "the right to use their language in official contacts." On the other hand, the law on the state language specifically restricts them in this right; for example, it requires that negotiations involving local self-administration can be held only in the Slovak language. The delegates from community representative bodies do not fall under any kind of state office; according to the Constitution, they have the right to speak in their mother tongue, which is, however, as I have mentioned before, in conflict with the law on the state language. Thus, communities are striving to eliminate a certain legal vacuum. The delegates have a legal opportunity to do so, based, on the one hand, on the Constitution, but also on the law on communities. The mistake need not be sought in self-administration, but in the uncoordinated legal standards.

[Buda] But it would appear that the law will nevertheless make its contribution. Under its influence, more Hungarians will learn Slovak, which will mean a broader application for them throughout the territory of the entire state.

[Bauer] I believe it is an exaggeration to expect the law to motivate someone to better learn the language. Anyone who anticipated such consequences overestimated the possibilities and the effectiveness of the law. At best, such a method of exerting pressure is counterproductive. It is not true that Hungarian nationals do not wish to learn Slovak, but this can be achieved through more effective modern methods that have been proven in practice. If the government, more precisely said, the

Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic, were focused on the interest of the Hungarians to familiarize themselves with the Slovak language, then it would use all possible means to help push through changes in the methodology used to provide instruction pertaining to that language. Although the languages of the world are taught by modern methods in our country as well, the Slovak language being taught in Hungarian schools thus far is taught by methods that date back to the origin of the Czechoslovak Republic. In this regard, the government still owes a great debt, and this debt cannot be paid off by this law.

Slovakia: New Studies Introduced for Highest-Level Officers

AU0603214896 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 5 Mar 96 p 5

[Report by TASR: "First Higher Academic Course of Slovak Army General Staff; Defense Minister Jan Sitek Yesterday Inaugurated New Model of Education"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Liptovsky Mikulas—Providing the highest level of specialized military education in the Army of the Slovak Republic is the aim of the First Higher Academic Course of the Slovak Army General Staff [Prvy Vyssi Akademicky Kurz Generalneho Stabu Armady SR], which Jan Sitek, minister of defense of the Slovak Republic, solemnly inaugurated at the SNP [Slovak National Uprising] Military Academy at Liptovsky Mikulas yesterday.

The three-term course of studies is attended by 14 students—brigade commanders, Defense Ministry functionaries, and staff of military educational establishments. The course of studies will allow them to expand their knowledge in the fields of security and defense policy and strategy and operational skills, improve their proficiency in the use of scientific methods of commanding troops, develop independent creative thinking, master the operational and tactical potentials of new weapons systems, and the like. The graduates of the course of studies will have the right to use behind their rank the designation member of General Staff, which is customary in NATO armies.

Hungary: U.S. Envoy's Views on Romanian 'Extremists' Noted

AU0603213196 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 2 Mar 96 p 3

[Editorial by Endre Aczel: "Americans at the Danube"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Alfred Moses is not the first and, probably, not the last U.S. ambassador in Bucharest who has a problematic attitude toward the "internal affairs" of the host country.

Of course, everything that rebounds in the ambassadors' attitude is not their personal dilemma but the dilemma of the United States itself regarding Romania.

In the past, by dissociating his foreign policy from Moscow and the Warsaw Pact, Ceausescu gained strategic merits for himself. Observed from here, Ceausescu's "national communism" was quite attractive in the Americans' eyes, at least as attractive as his despotism was disgusting in their eyes. When Carter made "respect for human rights" the standard of U.S. relations with other countries, the dilemma of the United States was whether, by calling him to account for human rights, they will push Ceausescu back into Moscow's arms, something that might indirectly strengthen the weakened positions of the Soviet Union. This would not have been a positive scenario after all. It is only logical that debates were held on the issue in the administration in Washington, and some officials fell victim to these debates. It has never been easy to evaluate Romania.

The current situation is largely similar to the previous one in the sense that the U.S. strategic interest toward Romania has now reemerged but, given Romania's domestic conditions, this is again a product that cannot be sold perfectly.

Regarding the former, in the wake of peacekeeping in Bosnia, the Americans are almost "out at the Danube." For them, the South European flow of the Danube (in the Balkans) has a totally different strategic importance compared with a few years ago. And Romania brings a key role in the Danube region extending up to Ukraine. The Americans would very much like to chain this country to themselves, also institutionally (see NATO).

However, a country cannot compete for NATO membership successfully today if there are extremist nationalist and irredentist forces in its government, like [Cluj Mayor Gheorghe] Funar's Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] and [Vadim] Tudor's Greater Romania Party, and if the government is the hostage of these parties.

Therefore, Alfred Moses voiced rather firm U.S. interests when he publicly explained how much Romania's NATO membership would benefit from getting rid of its "extremists."

They say that Alfred Moses could have conveyed this message quietly and personally by avoiding even the appearance of interfering in "internal affairs." I think, however, that Mr Moses had a good reason if he chose to speak publicly. It is possible that the Americans are now not only alarmed but also irritated by the influence of the extremist parties on the Romanian domestic policy life. It is possible that, by accepting the risks involved in making the argument public, the Americans hope to speed up certain cleansing processes.

Let us point out that, although the trap set by the American diplomat took the Romanian leadership by surprise, they reacted quickly and well. In a Romanian way, that is. The president mildly advised Moses not to make statements about extremists until he clarifies (in himself?, in a speech?) who are the extremists. However, the Romanian Foreign Ministry — Moses's direct partner — found nothing objectionable in the ambassador's statement. In other words, there was both criticism and agreement. Money wasted.

Hungary: FKGP MP Urges 'Reannexation' of Lost Lands

AU0603190996 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 2 Mar 96 p 3

[Report by unidentified correspondent: "Kavassy Wants 'Peaceful Reannexation'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian Parliament deputy Sandor Kavassy is proposing negotiations on "the peaceful reannexation" of Hungarian territories lost at the setting of Trianon borders. Kavassy, a member of the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP] group in Parliament, submitted an amendment motion to the draft resolution on "strengthening the bilateral Hungarian-Ukrainian treaty on cooperation and mutual assistance on border issues and regulations at the Hungarian-Ukrainian border."

According to the motion submitted by Sandor Kavassy, with a supplement, Parliament would call upon the government "to examine, in the course of outlining the common border, the territorial losses suffered by the communities along the border in the course of setting the so-called Trianon borders and to initiate talks on the peaceful reannexation of these territories."

Justifying his motion, Sandor Kavassy pointed out that the Trianon Peace Treaty had cut into the territory of 200 communities along the border: Barabas, Beregdaroc, Beregsurany, Lonya, Tiszakercseny, and Milotta all suffered territorial losses. The inhabitants here lost a total of 8,500 cadastral acres and this affected the smallholders most sensitively. Sandor Kavassy thinks it is important to discuss all this at the forthcoming border supervision and to "settle the issue peacefully and friendly, in the spirit of mutual understanding." Matyas Eorsi, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament, called Kavassy's motion "a monstrosity." Hungarian foreign policy endeavors to convince our neighbors and the world that Hungary is interested in the permeability of the borders, rather than their modification, Eorsi told MTI. He added that, with this motion, Sandor Kavassy had provided new arguments for Romanian and Slovak nationalist circles. This proposal serves the interests of the FKGP and of the nationalists in the neighboring countries rather than Hungary's interests, Eorsi pointed out.

Hungary: Government Parties' Illegal Revenue Criticized

LD0703100996 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0600 GMT 7 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] received 412,000 forints and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] received 1,478,000 forints illegally over the past few years. The State Audit Office objected to the fact the HSP — in addition to the illegal utilization of its property which was earlier criticized — had not even mentioned the sale of its limited company in its accounts.

According to the report, the SZDSZ rented out real estate which was not even owned by the party.

Hungary: Challenges for Right-Wing Parties Assessed

AU0103185196 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 1 Mar 96 p 3

[Editorial: "To the Right! But What Direction?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian right is facing a change. This weekend will tell what direction the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] will take. Minority parties with decreasing popularity would settle their internal affairs in the first half of the current parliamentary circle. Names rather than programs are confronting each other in public.

The cadres of the aforementioned two parties are facing the same dilemma—they must choose between radical phraseology and continued attempts to find a centrist ally. The former government parties currently forced into the opposition are constantly frustrated by the fact that [Smallholders Party chairman] Jozsef Torgyan beats them in loudness and popularity and the government coalition beats them in right-wing economic policy solutions. Torgyan's challenge is the stronger among the two. Thus, if Sandor Lezsak wins, the MDF will try to engage in politics in a way similar to that of the Smallhlders Party [FKGP]; namely, the MDF would seek allies among the factions that dropped from the national-populist wing. If Fuzessy remains in the position of KDNP executive chairman, the current KDNP tandem will definitely turn to the right as well. There will be no civic alliance, so the rightist parties will not be able to popularize their proposals of a uniform bourgeois solution until the next elections. In that case, however, they will hardly overcome the challenge that the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]-Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] stabilizes things with conservative solutions.

There is no demand for the old right-wing goods among the voters today — namely, for "national fateful issues." Hungarians are not willing to use nationalism to reply to others' nationalism. Society lost confidence in the government because of the bad living conditions, and not because of the government's "unnational" policy. In the meantime, Lezsak's trend would provide overall national answers to today's questions and would bring back the old movement style. In the KDNP, Chairman Giczy and Executive Chairman Fuzessy would represent similar solutions.

Antall's heritage is the other big dilemma facing the Hungarian right. One wing refers to the four-year government activity; the other wing refers to the warm movement style of the transitional years. Many people are still loyal to the late prime minister. However, others think that Jozsef Antall's stubborn observance of agreements and laws can no longer be followed; this must be discarded because this is the condition of "MDF's rebuilding" and overall right-wing cooperation. The 1990-1994 period must be discarded even for Torgyan's sake.

Have the latter forgotten that, in Antall's view, there was not a revolution situation in Hungary? This has not changed either.

Hungary: MDNP Interim Leadership Elected

LD0603204796 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The leadership of the Hungarian Democratic People's Party [MDNP], which was formed not long ago, has been elected. Members of the presidium are Gabriella Farkas, Laszlo Meszaros, Gyorgy Rasko, Tihamer Toth, and Lajos Zsebok. Jozsef Szabo, who was elected Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] presidium member at last weekend's national meeting but then resigned his membership and left the party, is the sixth member of the presidium.

According to the MDNP statutes adopted not long ago, the leader of the parliamentary deputies' group will become the seventh member of the presidium. At the moment, the party's constituent session is discussing the political program.

Hungary: Minister on Changes in Support for Unemployed

AU0103102396 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 29 Feb 96 pp 1, 5

[Report by Andrea M. Rimay: "From Interest Savings for Employment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A three-year agreement between the government and public employees may be achieved within two weeks, Labor Affairs Minister Peter Kiss said at an expert consultation on 28 February. Talking to NEPSZABADSAG, he believed that some of the privatization additional incomes would probably be used for export stimulation, and for programs which can within a short time help to increase employment. He also said that a new wage support system will be drawn up to make it easier for young people to find jobs.

About the agreement to be made with public employees, Kiss said that the draft is already past the expert preparation stage so there is a good chance for the affected interest representation groups and the government to sign it soon. On the renewal of interest coordination, Kiss said that the prime minister and the social partners had earlier agreed that they would again talk about the issue in April. In the meantime, experts consultations are being held between the Labor Ministry and the various organizations. These consultations make it possible for us to take steps toward renewing interest coordination without major agreements, the minister said. New coordination methods have already been set up and it appears to be attainable that interest coordination should be characterized by continuous talks and the desire for agreement rather than by the will to win. To our suggestion that certain organizations are protesting against the closed talks, Kiss reacted by saying that it is more efficient first to clarify the professional issues in a small group and coordination in the whole organization to follow this. He added that he is to meet all organizations where this issue emerges.

About the use of the interest savings arising from the privatization additional incomes, Kiss said that the government's proposal is being drawn up and they also expect suggestions from the social partners until the end of March. The prime minister has promised the social partners that they would consult on the various suggestions before the government's decision is made. In reply to what concrete goals the government would support, Kiss said that they wish to increase export support and loans for small enterprises.

We finally asked Kiss with what they would replace the unemployment benefit for people at the beginning of their careers, which will be abolished from the second half of the year. Kiss said that, on one hand, they wish to improve the chances for young people to find jobs through various training schemes and, on the other, an apprentice system will be introduced. In addition to this, they are also setting up a new wage support system for the employers. The draft containing the proposals will come before the government in April. They wish to design catch-up programs for those in the worst situation for finding jobs —namely those who did not even complete elementary education — with which they can at least get to the periphery of the job market. The benefits system is not good enough partly because these young people do not receive any support at the moment. More than 2 billion forints are available for the introduction of the new system. Kiss could not say exactly how many young people would be affected by these measures but believed that the 2 billion forints would be enough for the various programs. This amount is higher than what is now used for support, Kiss added.

Hungary: More Shooting Ranges Agreed for IFOR Use

LD0603194896 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1700 GMT 6 Mar 96

[Translated Excerpt] Several committees were in session today in parliament. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] The military shooting ranges will be used by IFOR [Implementation Force] troops not only in Taborfalva in Pest county, but also in Kaposvar and Pecsvarad. As it was announced at the session of the National Assembly's Defense Committee today, the American soldiers can take over the Taborfalva shooting range on 25 March, for 15 days each month. The Hungarian side did not give permission for American fighter helicopters to hold live fire maneuver in Taborfalva. However, they offered the central shooting range in the Bakony hills for the Americans to use, but the Americans eventually decided on Szentkiralyszabadja.

Hungary: Keleti Expects Russian Arm Shipments 'Soon'

AU0603190396 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 6 Mar 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Russian Armored Vehicles To Arrive Soon"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The obstacles hindering the beginning of the supply of Russian arms have been overcome and the first pieces of military equipment promised to Hungary in exchange for the outstanding Russian state debt will arrive in a matter of weeks, Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti told MAGYAR HIRLAP. A Russian delegation is expected to arrive in Budapest next week to set the final schedule of supplies.

An agreement was reached on the supply of arms worth a total of $320 million and part of this equipment should have been sent in November 1995. However, the Russian side encountered difficulties in financing the deal. The Hungarian Army is to receive 450 BTR-80 armored carriers and the Border Police are to receive 68 of these. The army will also receive 400 METIS armor-piercing missiles and 15 mobile launchers. The Border Police will receive 80 such missiles as well as 100 Niva jeeps, 1,200 pairs of infrared binoculars, and 8,500 bullet-proof vests. The Hungarian Air Force is to receive spare engines and spare parts at a total value of $50 million for its MiG-29 combat aircraft.

In connection with the Israeli offer to refurbish the MiG-21 combat aircraft, Gyorgy Keleti told us that, in the course of his visit to Israel last week, he had visited the LAHAV aircraft factory and thought it was a positive thing that they were trying to keep all kinds of military equipment in operation for a maximum period of time with various modernization solutions. The MiG-21 also belongs to this type of equipment. Hungarian experts will have to examine how to adapt MiG-21s and the BIS-types into long-term concepts. Keleti did not exclude the possibility of delaying the purchase of new combat aircraft for a few years. The government will soon be asking Parliament to authorize the issuing of tenders for the purchase of combat aircraft, Keleti told us.

B-H: Austria's Busek Rumored To Succeed Koschnick

AU0703104896 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 7 Mar 96 p 32

[Report by S. Herek: "Will Busek Succeed Koschnick?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vienna—After last week's EU foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels, at which the dominant topics were Koschnick's decision to resign and his pessimism regarding the situation in Mostar, Austrian Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schuessel, when asked whether he could imagine an Austrian as Koschnick's successor, said:

"I can imagine all sorts of things. We are looking for a person with comprehensive political experience." Mimicking journalists, Schuessel asked his predecessor, former Austrian Vice Chancellor Erhardt Busek the same question.

DIE PRESSE quoted Busek's response: "As far as the vacant post of EU Mostar administrator is concerned, it is true that I have had talks on the issue. However, it was just an idea."

In answer to what his conditions for taking up the offer to replace Hans Koschnick would be, Busek said that he had two basic conditions: the extension of the European administration's mandate, and the approval of the Croatian and Bosniak sides in Mostar. He added that this was the only way he could take up the post and do his best.

B-H: Izetbegovic Recovery 'Continuing Successfully'

LD0603225696 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who is being treated in the medical center in Sarajevo, today received in separate visits Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and General Rasim Delic, chief of General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and had short talks with them.

President Izetbegovic's recovery is continuing successfully.

B-H: Army Denies Media Reports on Training in Iran

AU0603202596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Some foreign, and especially U.S. media have recently been carrying frequent reports on our country having allegedly sent soldiers to Iran for training. The Press Center of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been authorized to announce that not a single member of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is currently being trained in Iran. Nor are there any plans or intentions regarding the training of members of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Iran.

Moreover, the ranks of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina do not include a single foreign citizen, unlike other military formations on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although our army representatives have on several occasions presented this fact to IFOR [Implementation Force] representatives, neither they nor the foreign media have reacted to this obvious violation of the provisions of the Dayton agreement. Instead of that, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is being criticized as a matter of course. There is no reason nor excuse for the media campaign in this respect, as the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been performing its duties in a disciplined manner. There is no need to exert pressure on it, now or in the future, particularly not media pressure, as it has so far shown at all levels of cooperation that it is ready for maximum cooperativeness and implementation of all its tasks and the agreements reached, reads the statement by the Press Center of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Security Service Aims for 'Complete Control'

AU2802120096 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 19 Feb 96 pp 22-24

[Article by Goran Rosic: "All Izetbegovic's Secret Services"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "There are approximately 160,000 Sarajevo inhabitants in our records who have committed some kind of offense that is punishable under either criminal or civil law. We have indicted only persons involved in terrorism, espionage, and drug trafficking; all other cases will be dealt with after the end of the war. Those convicted will work without pay on the reconstruction of our Bosnia-Herzegovina for a period of time depending on their sentence," this is what a high-level official of the special (secret) military police of the B-H Army 1st Corps (their members are characterized by their black uniforms) told an astonished group of foreign reporters in the spring of 1994 explaining what his service's responsibilities were. The author was at first not inclined to believe that this was true, especially because the aforementioned official was very "relaxed" when he explained these things and because of the high number he mentioned. In later talks with ordinary Sarajevo citizens, however, it has been established that everything he said was relatively correct. Most citizens know what the service's real activities are and how they are carried out; their opinions differ only regarding the number of citizens whose data are entered into the secret police's computer system.

It is astonishing that the service obtained information about possible criminals—apart from using the usual police methods—also on the basis of citizens' reports. The aforementioned official said that such reports were not checked immediately, but that verification of their correctness will be done in the postwar period. It was enough, in other words, for someone to get angry with someone else to have been put on the list of suspects, without his even knowing it at the time. Furthermore, if we know that there are almost no inhabitants of Sarajevo, who in the struggle for mere existence did not smuggle or commit some other wrong thing, the number of 160,000 people on the list (every second Sarajevo inhabitant) does not seem unbelievable.

They Killed a Wild Boar and Threw the Meat Away

Parallel to this service, several other police services have been interested in citizens since the beginning of the war. In the B-H Army, for example—which did not have uniforms and weapons for a very long time—a security service has existed from the very first day. Which details the officers in charge of security worked on and to what extent they "took care" of the people they controlled can be seen from a single example. During the period of complete famine (in the winter of 1993-94 when the members of the B-H Army 1st Corps units were getting only one meal a day!), members of a B-H Army unit killed a wild boar on one of the surrounding hills, but the security officer in charge ordered the meat to be destroyed. The explanation was that the meat was poisoned, but the real reason need not be mentioned in light of the growing Islamization of the B-H Army.

On the other hand, the B-H Interior Ministry has been shadowing popular personalities, especially reporters and politicians. In order to comprehend how the Interior Ministry works in such cases, we shall quote part of an open letter from Senad Avdic, editor-in-chief of the SLOBODNA BOSNA weekly, (the reporter who at the beginning of 1992 published the plan of the former Yugoslav People's Army called "RAM," which contained the details of the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina), to Alija Izetbegovic in December 1995 after he had been brutally beaten in the street. Avdic writes: "Some state institutions have taken certain security measures toward newspapers and people employed there. Newspaper employees have to report to the Interior Ministry. It is suggested to them that they cooperate and, if they do not agree, they are told they might be sent to 'Treskavica' [scene of fierce fighting in B-H Army 1st Corps area]. It has been required of them that they cover Senad Avdic first of all. They should report his meetings, conversations, the people he meets.... If you are personally interested, they have also been required to cover my possible contacts with Silajdzic, Durakovic, the Academy member Filipovic, Generals Halilovic and Pasalic..." and the letter concluded with the following words: "I do not know how much of this you can control. It is horrible if you cannot control it; one must flee this country.... In the three and a half decades of my life, I have never felt less safe, calm, and protected than now." Izetbegovic did not answer nor did he anywhere make a comment on the accusations, but in an interview he gave at the beginning of 1996 he stated coldbloodedly that it was possible that people were being beaten since "this is one of the things that happen in coffee houses now."

According to the Principles of the KOS and SDB

Knowing that, apart from that, there have been numerous attempts on lives and very "problematic deaths" (executioners were criminals and professional murderers who were awarded with the release from prison) of some prominent Bosnian Muslims in coffee houses "in peaceful times," everything becomes clear. I know that in other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina under B-H Army control the situation is no different. These examples are clear evidence that from the beginning of the war Izetbegovic has been building his security system on the principles of the KOS [counterintelligence service] and SDB [state security service] organizations that existed in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

This thesis is supported by the fact that Fikret Muslimovic (a close associate of Aleksandar Vasiljevic, leader of the KOS, which was the Counterintelligence Service of the former Yugoslav People's Army) was in charge of the security and counterintelligence services in the B-H Army, whereas the officer Mujezinovic was responsible for the same tasks at the Interior Ministry. Both served in various KOS structures for over 20 years. With their help and the help of their subordinates, who were also "taken over" from the former Yugoslav People's Army, Izetbegovic created his—as it is evident today—totalitarian and repressive regime. By having chosen to retain his position in this way, by looking for the main enemies in his own people, even though the war was raging, he obviously forgot that he himself was a victim of the same system. Therefore, no one, including Izetbegovic, should be surprised by the more and more frequent questions about how, on the one hand, it is possible that the state knows, for example, everything about its officials, officers, reporters etc., and why, on the other, it did not get a single piece of information about Chetnik intentions toward Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, etc...

Sarajevo Inhabitants 'Shadowed'

To what extent Izetbegovic and his party are worried by these questions asked by the public can be seen from the fact that the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina established the Agency for Research and Documentation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (AID) on 12 January 1996. Many Sarajevo inhabitants immediately made the ironic remark that a new, more modern service was hidden behind that name, which will follow and protect them from themselves even better and more carefully than all previous services. That this observation is true is confirmed by Bakir Alispahic's appointment, the former interior minister in the government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the agency's head. He was a faithful SDB [state security service of the former Yugoslavia] official before the war and a devoted executor of orders given by the Party of Democratic Action and its chairman during the war.

Already in his first public appearance, Alispahic hastened to explain that the agency's task would be to protect and develop the factors for the integration of the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He added that through research projects and documentation he would enable the implementation of the Dayton agreement, thus protecting the minimum of interests that Bosnia-Herzegovina has as an internationally recognized country. Some people were possibly confused and deceived by this definition of AID's tasks, but it is a fact that, "with the aim of working as efficiently as possible," AID has included the National Interpol Office in its structures. Apart from that, stamping out terrorism and drug trafficking (which were also the tasks of the secret service to which the aforementioned official was employed) are mentioned as its tasks, which makes it clear that all Izetbegovic's intelligence and counterintelligence services have thus been united under one administration. This is quite all right from the point of view of the state, but it is worrying that this is being done right now.

According to the Dayton agreement, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been given charge of all tasks, including intelligence tasks, that had previously been performed by the defense and interior ministries. This process should have been completed by the establishment of the government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Izetbegovic obviously did not like it, so he formed a body outside the Constitution. We shall not mention here the ways in which procedures were otherwise violated when AID was established; we shall only try to explain the consequences of that decision.

Respect for the Law

First, it can be concluded that his decision is a clear message that the Bosnian Muslim leadership does not agree to the weakening of the present central authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this way, Sarajevo is once again casting doubt on its sincere intention to enable the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to come to life, and thus the implementation of the Dayton agreement, too. Furthermore, apart from the ministries established under the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, parallel parts of the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry are being established, which seriously puts at stake the safety of citizens and respect for the law in the whole territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In a certain way this is completely blocking the work of its legal authorities. Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, therefore addressed an open letter to the members of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 9 February 1996, in which he pointed to blatant violations of the Federal Constitution and laws on republic ministries, warning of all the negative connotations that decision may have.

Especially worrying, however, is the fact that AID was established after the ruling party leadership and the commanders of the B-H Army had been "cleansed" of all who did not agree with the leading Muslim hardliners, even after it became known in Dayton that an election would be held in Bosnia-Herzegovina soon. The AID leader warns that this has practically made AID an intelligence agency, and—having in mind the present experiences with similar Izetbegovic services—also a repressive body of the Party of Democratic Action.

All this makes us conclude that complete control of Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens in the territories under B-H Army control, which is carried out on the principles of the KOS and the SDA of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—perhaps justified in wartime—is going on during peacetime. The only difference lies in the form and the name behind which the people in charge of the "protection" of citizens are hidden. It is a fact that control is now being performed by Alija Izetbegovic's faithful supporters and his followers, which leads to the conclusion that the SDA has started a fierce fight against everybody. They are interested neither in Dayton nor in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina nor its citizens; it is a mere fight for power, for the maintenance of their regime. Therefore, there is the troubling number of the 160,000 ordinary wretches mentioned at the beginning of this article in the computer (who knows how many of them there really are), only because they wanted to live [as published]. They can be certain that they will be used for various acts of blackmail and the settling of accounts between those who, in the struggle for power at the end of the 20th century under the pretext of "care and protection" for their citizens, allow the most intimate parts of their lives to be monitored.

[Box, p 24]

Sarajevo—An Espionage Center

Even before Serbia and the then Yugoslav People's Army started the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina, numerous intelligence officers and secret service informers from all relevant international political players appeared in Sarajevo overnight. Their number increased from day to day with the arrival of the UN Protection Force and with the beginning of the war. They started to be deployed all over Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are hardly any foreigners, including reporters and aid workers, who went to Bosnia-Herzegovina without perfoming an intelligence task for the state they came from apart from their offical duty. Through its "moles," like Nenad Kecmanovic, the Serbian intelligence service, for example, obtained all the defense plans made by the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Western intelligence services obtained the information on the infiltration of Mujahidins in the B-H Army. It must also be mentioned that many adventurers wanted to obtain secret information too, and many of them paid a high price—they disappeared. The most famous example is the case of an Italian reporter, who—researching the ways in which weapons were coming to Bosnia-Herzegovina—was first arrested by Karadzic's Chetniks and then by Izetbegovic's secret police.

Official Sarajevo could not hide a single intention (beginning from the deployment of its army units to the organization of life in the territories under the control of the B-H Army), and the same applies to Karadzic, too. The present "espionage situation" within Bosnia-Herzegovina has been additionally supported by the U.S. State Department's public decision that the CIA would in general "supervise" the implemenation of the Dayton agreement. Knowing all this, it must be expected that the aforementioned intelligence services will work even more seriously in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the near future. This is because every one of these intelligence services has its special interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this way, Sarajevo is becoming an intelligence center of extraordinary importance, like Berlin, Vienna, Beirut, and some others during the cold-war period.

B-H: Zubak Comments on Federation Prospects

AU0603174996 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Mar 96 p 18

[HABENA report: "SDA Leadership Still Wants a Civic State in Which the Croats Would Have a Status Like the Arabs in France"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was a guest at a panel organized by the Club of Bosniak intellectuals in Sarajevo. He addressed the audience and then answered more than 20 questions from the audience on the founding of the Federation, conditions for building it, difficulties in implementing the founding documents and other documents on peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and particularly the current relations between the two nations and national leaderships.

At the beginning of his address, President Zubak said that he had often wished to deepen the debate on the essential questions of Croat-Muslim relations and their joint perspective in general, but he had never found anybody with whom to discuss those matters. His speech at the meeting of the Constituent Assembly in Novi Travnik, which, in view of its tone and content, was an invitation to such a debate, met with silence, except for ad hoc shallow political reactions, while, according to Zubak, he wanted an answer, if not from Assembly deputies, then from other political and scientific circles among the Muslim nation.

"All conversations, and even those with journalists, boil down to the question of how long will Herzeg-Bosnia last, while nobody asks the essential question—why did the Croats establish a community first and only later a republic? What were their motives, needs, or interests? Nobody has ever read the fundamental decisions on the establishment of Herzeg-Bosnia, nobody recognizes that we took part in the referendum on Bosnia-Herzegovina, that we have always been the first to accept peace plans, that we were not a party to the negotiations when the Serb Republic was de facto recognized, that we took care of thousands of Muslim refugees, that we defended and liberated the Bosnia-Herzegovina's only link with the rest of the world, and that we confronted barehanded the Yugoslav armada. Simply, all this is being overlooked and we are now being accused of separatism," Zubak pointed out.

He added that the project of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was accepted by both the Bosniak and the Croatian sides as time was running out. "We laid down certain elements and later on the entire foundation and framework (Constitution) by which our mutual relations are arranged, without previously defining or redefining the political goals of both nations," President Zubak said, pointing out that this was precisely the main source of all the problems in developing the project called the Federation.

Speaking about problems in establishing the Federation, President Zubak said that the reason for them was not only to be found in the lack of mutual confidence, which in certain areas almost amounts to hostility, or in a continuing media war, destroying even what minimal Federation links have been established so far, but also in a different approach to the Federation, the interpretation of its constitutional provisions, relations within the Federation, and the Federation's relations with other factors.

All this, Zubak pointed out, springs from different political concepts and they must definitely be cleared up. Otherwise, according to Zubak, the work is a futile job and may easily turn into a new war, as some predict, such as THE NEW YORK REVIEW several days ago.

The official policy of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zubak explains, is unquestionable, and the political goal is quite clear: the Federation.

The essence of the problem, according to Zubak, is that the Muslim-Bosniak leadership has not accepted the Federation as its own model, a model of cohabitation and its future, but rather as a transitional state and means of accomplishing their final political goal: a civic republic. This political goal, Zubak continued, presupposes the domination of one nation over the other in a make-believe democratic civic state. As proof of this theory Zubak cited a statement by a current Muslim political leader, who had told Zenica television: "We have to build here a civilized state or else we stand no chance. This means that we are not supposed to build here a purely Muslim state, although it will de facto be one. It simply cannot be otherwise. It will be a state with Muslims making up 80 percent of the population and it will be Muslim, or Bosniak, if you will, as much as France is French. Although some 3 million Arabs currently live in France, it is still the French state, whose president and prime minister are French, as well as all the other ministers. It simply cannot be otherwise. Therefore, I think the fact that some 10 percent of the entire population will belong to other nationalities does not make any difference or can influence the fact that the people who fought for that state are entitled to all the rights, still observing the rights of other peoples as minorities."

"To show you that this is not an attitude or statement originating from the circumstances existing at the time," Zubak said at the panel, "I could list a number of speeches referring to the policy objectives of Muslim-Bosniak political leaders, but I will again draw upon the same place and another official statement made at a meeting of the Republic Assembly, that the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be either Serb or Croatian, but only Muslim, and a member of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action].

Zubak also warned that many decisions concerning the Federation are being made outside its bodies. Instead of supporting those who are for a principled implementation of the Washington agreement, a genuine media campaign is being launched, short of any counterarguments, aimed at discrediting Croats by spreading views that they are dismantling the republic, as some time ago when Croatian representatives insisted on the separation of Federation and Republic functions.

"I ask you, to whom does the Federation belong? Is it Croatian heritage, while the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is Muslim heritage? We are being blamed again because the BH Army did not reach the Drina, because Sarajevo has not still been unblocked, because pensioners have not received their pensions yet, or invalids their artificial limbs, or because the Neretva has flooded part of Mostar," Zubak said.

In Zubak's opinion, if one envisages the Federation or the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina to suit one's own nation only, then it ought to be known that such an attitude is a death sentence for the Federation. According to Zubak, those who see Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its borders, while designating its president and ministers from one nation only, must give up all their illusions.

"As for the Croats, it is insulting to hear, even as a metaphor, about us having the political status of France's Arabs, let alone accept it," Zubak said.

As particularly tendentious assertions, Zubak referred to those that Croats and Serbs have their reserve countries and that there are no constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such assertions, Zubak says, are actually attempts to carry out even in this sphere the plan for 80 percent.

President Zubak pointed out that none of the 20 principles in the SDA platform refers to the Federation. Consequently, the Croats believe that the Bosniak-Muslim leadership does not actually want the Federation, but is trying to show both to its own and the international public that it is actually the Croats who do not want the Federation.

President Zubak said that the Federation could survive under pressure exerted from abroad, but it would be a mere testing ground where the larger nation would tend to dominate, while the smaller one would be struggling for equality, which may eventually result in disintegration, as had already happened in the former SFRY, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia. President Zubak stressed that in all the three cases those who had wanted to dominate eventually lost.

Zubak pointed out that it would be wrong to conclude from his statement that he was against the Federation. On the contrary, he was for the Federation, but the one of completely equal nations, now and in the future, which meant that he supported the Federation wholeheartedly, but without obscure goals or intentions.

President Zubak said that for the full expression of one people's national being, it is not necessary for it to identify itself completely with the state. There may exist certain historical circumstances that impose the need to create within a state's sovereignty a social, economic, political, cultural and any other space for the existence, life, and development of several nations. In such states, each nation ought to have the right to shape its life there according to its own traditions, but never at the expense of the rights, freedoms, and interests of other nations living in the same state. Zubak gave Switzerland and Belgium as examples of successful functioning of such a state.

In Zubak's view, now is the right time for the Croats and the Bosniaks-Muslims to get rid of their statuses as religious groups, as well as of lifestyles of anonymous minorities. This is a time for national euphoria and assertion and, in Zubak's opinion, these people must go through this phase, which ought not to be inhibited because, Zubak believes, all the events over the past years are precisely a consequence of the previous inhibition of this process. However, Zubak went on to say, this process must be channeled in the right direction, without concocting various historical or other stories that some nations are more authentic and numerous and are therefore entitled to more rights than others that should therefore have fewer rights. Such tendencies may be productive from the point of view of homogenizing one's own nation, but they are counterproductive in terms of the state in which two or more nations live, because other nations feel it as a degradation, which inevitably leads to the disintegration of such a state.

"In view of the concept and vision that I have stated here, I think we could be able to find a modus vivendi and thus solve the political riddle: two nations, one entity; or even a more complicated invention: one state, two entities, and three nations," B-H Federation President Zubak concluded.

B-H: BH-PRESS, Zubak Clash Over 'Fabricated' Report

AU0603184196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] After AFP yesterday cited a SLOBODNA DALMACIJA report that Federation President Kresimir Zubak thinks that the Bosniaks and Croats could go back to war if the differences that threaten to break up the Federation are not resolved, President Zubak's office has issued a denial to BH-PRESS, harshly protesting the carrying of unverified information, which undoubtedly shows that activities connected with the media war are involved here.

We inform the public that on 5 March 1996, President Zubak did not give any interviews, so the report on the interview allegedly given to SLOBODNA DALMACIJA is fabricated and, we assess, directed against official representatives of the Croatian nation, the denial reads.

The BH-PRESS editorial board points out that they accurately reported the AFP item, in which it was said that it was an interview, as it deemed that [words indistinct] warning deserve to be publicized in our media.

At the same time, the editorial board absolutely rejects the insinuation about waging any kind of media war, particularly not against official representatives of the Croatian nation. In our opinion, it would be much more advisable and useful to direct such accusations on media warfare and criticism of Croatian officials to some address other than BH-PRESS.

Once again, the editorial board tried to obtain a comment from President Zubak's office on the SLOBODNA DALMACIJA text, but for reasons that are inexplicable to us, it was unable to do so, as was the case on several other previous occasions in connection with other matters.

B-H: UN Denies Muslims Expelled From Banja Luka

LD0503232796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2323 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, March 5 (TANJUG)—U.N. officials in Banja Luka refuted Tuesday allegations of expulsions of Muslims from this biggest city in the (Bosnian Serb state) Republika Srpska.

The U.N. civilian sector office dismissed as untrue reports to this effect repeated since Monday by the Muslim media quoting the international police force in Sarajevo.

The office said that it had the mandate to monitor human rights practices and the humanitarian situation in the Banja Luka area and that it had no information about any forcible expulsions.

International police force spokesman in Sarajevo Alexander Ivanko said Monday that 160 Muslims had been evicted from their homes in Banja Luka by Serb refugees from Sarajevo.

On Tuesday, Ivanko apologized to the Bosnian Serbs for the false statement.

B-H: Iran Pledges Humanitarian Aid During Reconstruction

LD0603231896 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the countries which offered considerable help to Bosnia-Herzegovina during the aggression. Mr. Seyyed Mohsen Rasid ol-Eslami, a representative of the Iranian Embassy in Sarajevo, speaks for the news program on forms of aid from friendly Iran in the future.

[Begin ol-Eslami recording, in Persian with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] We are prepared, just as we supported the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the past, to support you in the future, in the period of reconstruction. In order to strengthen cooperation in this sphere, we have decided to open a permanent office in Sarajevo for humanitarian aid in the reconstruction period.

In addition to the clinic already operating in Sarajevo, we plan to open a similar clinic in Bihac, and preparations have already been made.

We will try to help with the return of refugees, naturally in coordination with the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNHCR, and all humanitarian organizations operating here. [end recording]

B-H: Portugal's Vitorino Urges Investment in Bosnia

BR0103143596 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 28 Feb 96 p 7

[Report by Eduardo Mascarenhas: "Invest in Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Snow and thick fog caused an almost four-hour delay in the start of Defense Minister Antonio Vitorino's official visit to Bosnia. The adverse weather conditions forced the minister to change the program, coming directly from Sarajevo—where he landed—to the headquarters of the Airborne Brigade command center in Rogatica, some 70 kilometers away from the Bosnian capital.

In Rogatica, Antonio Vitorino lunched with the Portuguese military leaders who are on a mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Vitorino took the opportunity to express his full "support and appreciation" for the Portuguese personnel and the extremely efficient way in which they are carrying out the mission assigned to them, and for contributing generally to bringing peace to the territory. The minister said that the way in which the Portuguese military personnel had managed to achieve the goals of their mission "under such adverse conditions" was "exemplary."

On the subject of normalizing living conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Minister Vitorino threw down the gauntlet to Portuguese businessmen, asking them to prepare themselves—at short notice—to take up the challenge of making considerable investments here.

Stressing that "security, human rights, and holding elections" are goals which must be achieved as soon as possible, Antonio Vitorino stressed that "this region's economy" is also rather important. Here, the minister felt that Portuguese businessmen could and must have a role to play. Investment and economic development are factors which help to strengthen democracy everywhere, especially in Bosnia. They must be able to rely on Portugal's presence and intervention, the minister said during the various meetings he had throughout the day—especially when he met with representatives of the local Serbian authorities.

Deadlines Will Be Met

The defense minister reiterated that Portugal's military presence within IFOR [Implementation Force] will last as long as originally planned, i.e., about 12 months.

In the afternoon, Antonio Vitorino, accompanied on his trip by Cerqueira Rocha, Army Chief of Staff general, also visited a number of posts where Portuguese military personnel are stationed.

Due to security rules imposed by IFOR, the Portuguese minister did not spend the night in Sarajevo, and so continued on to Rome at the end of the day, where he will meet today with his Italian counterpart.

B-H: Serb Bank Governor Sees 'Rapid Recovery' Ahead

LD0603202396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1414 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 6 Mar (SRNA)—Manojlo Coric, governor of the Serb Republic's National Bank, has said that lifting sanctions and establishing payment operations with the FRY offer a great opportunity for the rapid recovery of the Serb Republic economy.

In a statement to SRNA, Governor Coric particularly stressed that the Serb Republic would continue "with certain specific conditions, to carry out [Yugoslav National Bank governor] Avramovic's Program 2 for the economic recovery of the country."

"The Serb Republic's main trading partner initially will be the FRY, because these are two complementary economies which have established good cooperation, even in conditions of war," Coric said.

He noted that payment operations would take place in one direction initially, because of the flow of funds from companies and banks in the Serb Republic to the FRY, which can be expected to cause liquidity problems for banks in the coming month.

"However, with the recovery of industrial production and an increase in exports, cash needs will be reduced, except for meeting the most essential payments to pensioners and families of fallen soldiers and war invalids," the governor of the Serb Republic National Bank said in conclusion.

B-H: Switzerland Lifts Sanctions Against RS

LD0403172196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1606 GMT 4 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, March 4 (TANJUG)—The Swiss Government said Monday [4 March] it had passed a decision to lift the sanctions against Republika Srpska [RS] (Bosnian Serb Republic).

The decision covers all economic sanctions, including a deblocking of RS financial funds in Swiss Banks.

A government spokesman said in Bern the decision was in keeping with the efforts of the international community to implement the Dayton Peace Accord on Bosnia.

This decision is also in line with Switzerland's efforts, especially now that it chairs the Organization for Security and cooperation in Europe, to show in practice a complete lack of bias in the peace process in Bosnia.

Switzerland did not delay with its decision following last week's U.N. Security Council resolution to suspend these sanctions.

The Swiss Government acted similarly with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Just one day after the U.N. Security Council suspended all sanctions against Yugoslavia, the Swiss Government on Nov. 24 last year announced it was lifting all economic sanctions against that country.

B-H: Krajisnik Says Muslims Planning 'Incident' for 8 Mar

LD0603153996 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1446 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Obrenovac, 6 Mar (TANJUG)—In connection with a session of the NATO Council of Ministers, which is to be held on 8 March in Sarajevo, Momcilo Krajisnik, Serb Republic People's Assembly president, has said "there are serious indications that the Muslim side is preparing an incident for that day and that it will try to shift the blame for it onto the Serb side." Krajisnik has also warned the public at home and abroad that "some new Markale [Sarajevo market site of many civilian deaths] may reoccur, according to the well-known scenario." .

In a statement to Radio Obrenovac [local radio station in Serbia], Krajisnik said that the plan for the exodus of the Serbs from Serb Sarajevo was devised in such a way—with the tacit agreement of the international community and continuous provocations by the Muslim police—that nobody wanted to risk staying in this area.

Krajisnik also said that, of 50,000 Serbs who lived in Ilijas, Vogosca and Rajlovac before the war, only 1,500 remain there. Of 10,000 Serbs who lived in Hadzici, only a handful remains. Half of the Serbs who lived in Ilidza have gone, while all the Serbs are going to leave Novo Sarajevo.

The Serb Republic Assembly president said that, if at the session of the NATO Council of Ministers a decision is reached for IFOR [Implementation Force] to take an active part in searching for alleged war criminals, IFOR will lose its objective role, which is primarily linked with the restoration of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"IFOR should neither be a prosecutor nor a policeman. Regardless of everything, we are still ready to cooperate with the international community up to the limit whereby the vital interests of the Serb nation are not threatened," Krajisnik said.

B-H: Karadzic's Serbs Arrest 14 Civilians in IFOR Zone

AU0603202096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities have today announced that Karadzic's Serbs arrested 14 citizens of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the road in northeastern Bosnia controlled by U.S. IFOR [Implementation Force] soldiers. These 14 people were stopped while travelling along the Posavina corridor between Tuzla and the border with Croatia, an unnamed official of the Cantonal Administration in Tuzla said. He said that the cantonal authorities had cautioned the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina not to travel along this corridor as IFOR cannot guarantee them security on this road. He added that the Northeastern Sector commander, U.S. General William Nash, had been informed on the arrest of these 14 people and was asked to do everything possible to have them released. Local officials failed to identify the arrested people. They only said that they were civilians.

B-H: Karadzic Awarded for 'Promoting Russia's Defense'

AU0303155096 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 2 Mar 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Radovan Karadzic To Receive 'Andrey I' Award"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, has been given the 'Andrey I' award for 1995, which—at the proposal of the International foundation for Slav literature and culture—is being awarded by the Foundation of Apostle St. Andrey I from Moscow, SRNA reports.

The written exposition says that Karadzic is being awarded for a lifetime devoted to serving his country and his people, for strengthening the brotherhood among Slav and Orthodox peoples, and also for promoting Russia's defense, economic, and cultural power. "The foundation is awarding Karadzic not only as a statesman and invincible fighter but also as a prominent poet," and expresses hope that several of the author's poems will be read out at the award ceremony in the mother tongue.

The award ceremony is to be held on 27 April 1996 in Moscow.

B-H: Brcko Mayor Says Sarajevo Serbs To Reinforce Claim

AU0603190896 Paris AFP in English 1848 GMT 6 Mar 96

[By Mark Rice-Oxley]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brcko, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 6 (AFP)—Thousands of Serbs arriving from Sarajevo will wrest control of this battleground Serb-held northern Bosnian town from the grasp of Bosnian Moslems, the town's Serb "mayor" said Wednesday.

In an interview with AFP, Serb "mayor" Miodrag Pajic said that 3,000 Serbs from Sarajevo's suburbs had recently flooded into Brcko and said they would strengthen the Serb claim to the town when international arbitrators decide its future later this year.

"It's inconceivable that Brcko should be taken away from the Serbs because there are thousands of refugees and we can't resettle them again," Pajic said.

Brcko, a small town in northern Bosnia, is considered a vital interest by both Moslems and Serbs.

It lies at the narrowest point of the Serbs' east-west corridor linking the two halves of the Serb Republic and blocks a north-south rail-route vital to the Moslems.

Negotiators at Dayton failed to persuade either party to relinquish the town and agreed a six-month arbitration process, due to start on June 20.

On Tuesday, a local committee of Serb leader Radovan Karadzic's ruling Serb Democratic Party (SDS) said money should be put into repairing former Moslem homes in Brcko for Serbs to be resettled there, in order to manipulate the decision of the arbitrators, they said.

International aid agencies have regularly accused the hardline Serb authorities meanwhile of deliberately prompting the Serb flight from districts around Sarajevo which are returning to the control of the Moslem-led government.

Already Wednesday scores of refugees were milling around the corridors of the town hall, while the streets outside were blocked with cars bearing Sarajevo number plates.

"The (Serb) authorities told us to come here," said Tanja, a Serb from Ilijas, north of Sarajevo, in Brcko Wednesday. "And there will be thousands more," she added.

"We've done everything we had to under the Dayton agreement, and now we have nothing."

Bosnian Moslems kicked out of Brcko early in the war by the Serbs have threatened that they will not accept the town being given to the Serbs and the regional Bosnian army commander General Sead Delic told AFP earlier this year it would "mean war" if Brcko stayed Serb.

According to Pajic, however, "all the other solutions (for the town) would be deeply unfair to the Serbs because it would force people here to move for the third time—where would they go this time?"

To switch control to the Moslem-Croat federation, as the Sarajevo government is demanding, "would be yet more ethnic cleansing. It's not possible to solve the Brcko question like that," Pajic said.

"The Serbs have a right to their own entity—the Dayton agreement gives them this—but if you take Brcko away, there will be no single entity. It doesn't make sense."

Pajic said Brcko could never be a multi-ethnic town again, and that the notion enshrined in the peace accords that all people should be able to return to their former homes was never going to be realised.

"Sarajevo is now an ethnically-cleansed town. Why should Brcko not be the same?" he asked.

"Serbs are now living in buildings where Moslems and Croats used to live. I can't throw them out."

B-H: Serb Refugees From Hadzici Arrive in Bratunac

LD0603222596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2006 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratunac, 6 Mar (SRNA)—Refugees from the Serb municipality of Hadzici, which Muslim police entered this morning, have been arriving in Bratunac throughout the day and this evening.

According to the new arrivals, of the 7,000 people living in Hadzici at the time of the signing of the Dayton Agreement, only 60 remain.

The arrival of remaining refugees is expected tonight or tomorrow. They will all be sent to collective accommodation centers in Bjelovac and Fakovici.

SRNA has learned from the municipal headquarters for the reception of refugees that around 6,000 Serbs have arrived in Bratunac, 2,000 of whom have been settled in houses.

Fifty cubic meters of firewood was delivered this evening for some 1,000 refugees from Hadzici accommodated in three schools in the city center of Bratunac.

B-H: Croat Criticism of Muslim Internal Affairs Handling

LD0603182496 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the latest events in the Sarajevo suburb of Hadzici, I consider it necessary to inform the public of the following, a statement from Jozo Leotar says:

The law on internal affairs decrees that, when it came into effect on 1 February 1996, the former Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia ceased to exist. The law envisages that these two ministries of internal affairs should be transformed into the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and cantonal ministries of internal affairs. So far, only the minister and his deputy exist in the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The federal partner is behaving in this transitional period as though only the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia has been abolished and is taking upon itself the exclusive right to represent the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This is confirmed by the way in which civilian authority is being taken over in the Sarajevo suburbs, which the Serbs are leaving voluntarily. In order to avoid the same thing happening in Hadzici, the police administration in Kiseljak dispatched a group of policemen to take over supervision of a part of Hadzici as members of the federal police and with federal insignia. With the help of the Implementation Force, instead of these policemen from the Kiseljak police administration, police forces of the Sarajevo security services center have been deployed in Hadzici.

The composition of this police force has been determined without my knowledge as deputy minister of internal affairs of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the federal partner is thereby violating the law, Jozo Leotar writes.

B-H: Presidency's Kljujic Receives New Croatian Envoy

AU0503201896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Stjepan Kljujic, [ethnic Croat] member of the State Presidency, has received newly appointed Croatian Ambassador Darinko Bago. They discussed the current problems between the two countries. The implementation of the Federation was top of the agenda. It was said that this is of great importance not only for Mostar but also for the solution to the issue of Sarajevo.

Ambassador Bago stressed that Croatia would do everything to assist the return of refugees and displaced people to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Sarajevo Canton Formation Adjourned

AU0403194696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sarajevo City Assembly met today. The planned constitution of the transitional assembly of the Sarajevo Canton was adjourned. Today's session was attended by Izudin Kapetanovic, prime minister of the Federation. Aida Omerovic has the details:

[Omerovic] The transitional assembly of Sarajevo Canton should have been created at today's session of the Sarajevo City Assembly. Although elections of [words indistinct] for Sarajevo Canton were carried out in all nine municipalities that the City of Sarajevo has according to the Dayton agreement, the cantonal assembly has not been formed. First to speak at the meeting was (Ismet Goran Kapetanovic), chairman of the Sarajevo SDA [Party of Democratic Action] cantonal committee. He pointed out that the SDA reached an agreement with [word indistinct] and SDP [Social Democratic Party] and that (?seats) have been ensured for the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] which has 11 percent of the deputies, while in the past it had (?10) percent. However, the HDZ failed to support this agreement, so the SDA suggested a postponement of four days so that the HDZ could present additional remarks.

The stand of the Sarajevo HDZ City Committee, on behalf of which Ante Zelic, deputy mayor of Sarajevo, spoke, is that the formation of Sarajevo Canton is an anticonstitutional category. Unlawfulness lies in forming the canton without the Croats, Zelic said, and pointed out that the SDA would have a complete majority in that canton and that it will thereby be a single-party canton. Ante Zelic concluded his speech with the following, I quote: Such [word indistinct] of Croats as a federal partner leads to an exodus of Croats from this city. I am afraid of Sarajevo becoming—at an international level—a bigger federal problem than Mostar is, unquote.

Representatives of the UBSD [Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats], SDP, and [word indistinct] did not agree with this stand and gave their consent for the formation of Sarajevo Canton. They only presented some minor remarks regarding the work and elections of deputies from some city municipalities. Following the debate, Sarajevo Mayor Tarik Kupusovic concluded the session. The cantonal assembly session should be held in four or eight days, that is, when an interparty agreement is reached. [passage indistinct]

B-H: SDA: Transform Sarajevo Council Into Cantonal Body

AU0503210096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A session of the Sarajevo City Council was held today. It was concluded at the session that the city council should present to the Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina an amendment proposal for the city council to be transformed into a cantonal transitional council, which would function until the elections. This conclusion reactivates the earlier proposal by the deputy club of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], which was today presented by SDA deputy Muhamed Kalibegovic. [passage omitted]

B-H: USDB Wants Sarajevo Organized as Canton

LD0503231596 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The city of Sarajevo should be organized as a canton because in this way it would acquire certain powers, the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats [USDB] said at its news conference today.

The rights of all citizens of Sarajevo should be equal, too, regardless of their national and religious affiliation.

The USDB has decided to enter a coalition with all democratically oriented parties. With reference to this, consultations are being carried out with leaders of the Socialist Democratic Party, the (?HSS), the Republican Party, the Liberal Bosniak Organization, and Haris Silajdzic.

Tokic [USDB chairman] describes this move as a way of preventing national division and preserving the democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: LS Leader Fears Country Heading for Division

AU0703105296 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (Europe edition) in Serbo-Croatian 6 Mar 96 p 7

[Report by "R. LJ.": "Fear of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Division"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rasim Kadic, leader of the Liberal Party [LS] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has said that his news conference yesterday was one of the most difficult in the last few years. He spoke mainly about the problems of the future of Sarajevo. The first meeting of the Sarajevo Cantonal Assembly is, according to Kadic, one of the most important political events of this year. Mentioning two possible extremes, the division of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina versus its success as a model of civilizational life, Kadic stressed the example of Sarajevo as a model of the latter.

"I am surprised that the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] City Committee so strongly opposed the cantonization of Sarajevo. I saw the document that was signed by top HDZ representatives, in which they agreed with the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]. This document foresees the creation of a Sarajevo canton, but had a note saying that the internal structure will be agreed later."

According to Kadic, all this could be the beginning of the final division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the HDZ City Committee's declaration that the Croats will not survive or even remain in Sarajevo if it becomes a canton should be taken seriously.

Kadic says that matters have become so complicated that he is afraid of making any predictions. In the LS they are pessimistic, because they do not see in the current ruling structures political powers that are prepared to put an end to the negative trend toward division within the Federation.

B-H: Tuzla-Podrinje Canton Preelection Situation Viewed

AU0603120096 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 2 Mar 96 p 6

[Article by Samir Kahrovic: "Opposition Versus Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The current situation in Tuzla's preelection political activity could, in short, be defined as an assessment of the starting positions by an analysis of the results of the five years of political parties, and choosing the best ways and the best teams to take the lead in the election race. The real start to the election can only be expected in a month or two.

In the two ruling Bosnia-Herzegovina parties, the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] and HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], in the case of Tuzla the two opposition parties, there are ongoing elections for the municipal, that is, local boards of those parties.

The seat of the president of the SDA Municipal Board of Tuzla has been emptied by the appointment of Dr. Mirsad Kikanovic to the office of republican minister of finance, so that now the most serious candidate for the president is Adnan Jahic, acting vice president of the Tuzla SDA.

Election Headquarters

The Secretary of the SDA Cantonal Board, Salko Bukvarevic, tells us that currently there are activities directed at forming the cantonal and municipal election headquarters, which will coordinate and prepare election activities.

"The constant activities of the SDA in this region are the implementation of the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and taking care of and solving the problems of the refugees' existence, that is what we are working on day by day," says Bukvarevic.

A scientifically based opinion poll is being prepared, which should give answers to the Party of Democratic Action's rating among the people in the region of Tuzla-Podrinje [Drina river basin] Canton. This anonymous random sample survey should be carried out in April and should comprise a large number of surveyed citizens in the territory of the Canton.

"First of all, this opinion poll will show what the people reproach the SDA with mostly, which officials the people would not like to see on the election lists, and what the people think the party should offer in its program," Bukvarevic says.

Regarding the development of the election activities themselves, Bukvarevic points out that the most important thing is "that the SDA will not start from the positions of the ruling party in the sense that it will not slide but work exclusively in line with democratic methods."

Regarding the possible appearance of the SDA with some of the parties, Bukvarevic says that there have been no meetings or agreements with any of the political parties in that area.

New Names in the Boards

The HDZ of the Salt Canton hopes that it will have a better result in this year's elections than five years ago, with some 30,000 Croats now living in the region of the Tuzla-Podrinje Canton. "Our primary task, upon the end of the state of war, is to consolidate our lines and prepare ourselves for activity in peacetime conditions," says Pejo Banovic, president of the Tuzla HDZ Board.

During March and April elections will be carried out in the municipal branches, as well as the elections for the municipal and cantonal board, and it is expected that many new names will enter the boards.

One of the major election programs of the Tuzla HDZ is the creation of a municipality with a Croatian majority, for which the HDZ has already drawn up a survey which will be submitted upon the adoption of the Law on Local Self-Government at the cantonal level. The Tuzla HDZ has offered talks on this subject to all the parties participating in the Municipal Assembly, and those talks are expected to take place soon.

It is practically impossible to observe the two ruling parties in Tuzla, UBSD [Union of Social-Democrats of Bosnia-Herzegovina] and SDP [Social Democratic Party], separately in the election phase. Early this year those two parties formed a committee with the task of preparing the integration of those two parties into one.

It seems, meanwhile, that this committee has not been very busy. Members of SDP and UBSD are pretty impatient to see the integration of their two parties: The European socialist parties have been motivating them for this integration by promising them concrete financial help, which would be welcome regarding the modest financial funds.

When Will Integration Happen?

The process of "integration" has been slowed down mostly because of the mystery about the top personnel of that new party, whose new name will most probably be the Bosnian Social-Democrats. Of course, the most serious candidates for the leading figure are Dr. Zlatko Lagumdzija and M.S. Selim Beslagic. Answering the question whether to go into integration before or after the elections, the Tuzla SDP advocates integration as soon as possible.

Otherwise, both UBSD and SDP are still in the preparation phase of election activities, but one has an impression that the officials of those two parties are moving more among the electorate than the SDA or HDZ officials.

The UBSD, which had practically no traditionally organized membership is right now in the phase of organizing itself in the whole territory of the Federation. The UBSD will adopt a detailed program of the election activities at the convention to take place in Tuzla, early in April.

As far as the SDP is concerned, it should have some kind of "minicongress" during March, also in Tuzla. Regarding the first indications of the election rules, both the UBSD and SDP have a lot of objections, criticizing the rules as favoring the ruling parties. The key objection is that the Serbs from the territory of the Federation are not given an opportunity to vote for a member of the future Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the ranks of the Serb nation.

B-H: Serb Elections Proposed for 14 Jun-14 Sep

AU0403183796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Mar 96 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Elections in the Serb Republic Between June and September"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Pale, (FONET)—Slobodan Kovac, member of the Serb Republic's Commission for Establishing Regulations in the Bosnian Elections, announced on 2 March that the first general elections in this former Yugoslav republic are supposed to take place between 14 June and 14 September this year, SRNA reports. "The dates for holding local elections—municipal and cantonal—as well as those on a higher level, that is, the People's Assembly and the Presidency of the Serb Republic, the Chamber of Representatives of the Federation, the Chamber of Representatives, and the three-member Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be determined subsequently," Kovac explained. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb Democratic Party-Homeland Front Splits

LD1702191696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1637 GMT 17 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Banja Luka, 17 Feb (TANJUG)—The party Serb Democratic Union-Homeland Front in the Serb Republic from today will be called the Homeland Party, and the new president will be Milorad Milakovic from Prijedor.

The electoral conference held in Banja Luka was characterized by heated discussions on appointment issues, especially on the post of the party president. The conference ended with announcements of a party split.

After the election results were announced, Former President Bozidar Bojanic, a solicitor from Banja Luka, said that the party will continue to operate under its old name. In practical terms this means the formation of a new party [as received].

Milakovic, the new president of the Homeland Party, said that the party will retain its national color and that it will operate within the political center. As main tasks he cited the normalization of life through efforts toward complete implementation of the Dayton agreement, revitalizing of the economy, and social justice. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb Radical Party Reelects Chairman Poplasen

LD2802172596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1407 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 28 Feb (SRNA)—The Serbian Radical Party of the Serb Republic [SRS

RS] has moved over to a new model of party organization and has carried out radical personnel changes.

As the new general secretary of the SRS RS, Miodrag Rakic, told SRNA today, a meeting of the central parent administration in Belgrade has reelected Dr. Nikola Poplasen as head of the radicals in the Serb Republic. The new chairman of the SRS RS executive committee is Mirko Blagojevic from Bijeljina and the deputy chairman Nikola Spiric is from Banja Luka.

According to Rakic, the SRS RS is organizationally divided into seven regions: Prijedor, Banja Luka, Doboj, Bijeljina, Zvornik, Romanija, and Herzegovina.

Croatia: Susak, U.S. Official Discuss Cooperation

LD0603153396 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak has met Togo West, secretary of the U.S. Department of the Army. Anabela Lajkauf has a report:

[Lajkauk] Secretary West arrived in Zagreb within the framework of his tour of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Hungary. The main topic of talks was the continuation of cooperation between the United States and Croatia. Secretary West said the following in this connection:

[Begin West recording in English fading into Serbo-Croat translation] The aspirations of your government and your people will be realized through our cooperation and support from the United States. This is a promise which will materialize and that is precisely why I am visiting your country today. [end recording]

[Lajkauk] Asked to comment on Croatia's chances of being admitted to the NATO Partnership for Peace program, Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak said:

[Begin Susak recording] I have already said that Mr. Perry will table this proposal at a NATO meeting in mid-May, and I hope this will happen. [end recording]

[Lajkauk] In connection with the same topic, Mr. West went on to say:

[Begin West recording in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] As you know, there is a rule that has to be observed, and that is that all current NATO members have to be in agreement with such a decision. That is a process, and there is a desire shared by our countries to strengthen relations in every aspect. We support such trends and I am here as part of it. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Croatia: Granic 'Optimistic' After Dayton Accord

BR0703105696 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 Mar 96 p 9

[Report by Ulf Andenas: "Croatia Could Not Wait Any Longer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Croatia had to take its fate in its own hands without waiting for the international community during the war in the Balkans."

This was the claim made by Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic when we met with him yesterday on the first day of his visit to Norway.

"The presence of UN forces along the old front line froze an intolerable situation solid. If we had not intervened, a large part of our country would have remained Serb-occupied, Bihac would still be under siege, there would still have been war in Bosnia, and no progress would have been made in the peace process because there would have been no change to the strategic situation," Granic said.

At the same time he deeply regrets the excesses against Serb civilians after the recapture of the Serb rebels' regions in Croatia.

"The excesses greatly damaged Croatia's reputation, whether they were committed by organized criminals or by undisciplined soldiers," he said.

Wants To Join EFTA

Getting away from the necessity of the war, Croatia wants to integrate into international and Western cooperation as far as possible. Croatia is interested in joining the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] free trade organization, of which Norway is one of the few remaining members. Such membership could be a step on the road to EU membership, Granic said.

"A conflict between Croats and Muslims would lead to an independent Muslim state. Such a state could create an opening for radical Islamic forces. That is why the federation between the Croats and Muslims is important for Europe's stability," he said.

"Croatia is ready to cooperate fully with the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague," Granic added.

The 48-year-old foreign minister is reckoned to be one of the most moderate, cool-headed members of Croatia's nationalistic government. He makes a good impression on foreign negotiating partners and avoids extremist and chauvinistic statements.

Respected

In the country's tough political climate he is one of the politicians who is also respected by political opponents. He was not involved in politics during the communist era, but studied at Harvard in the United States, for example, to become one of his country's most prominent physicians. He was Croatia's deputy prime minister before taking over his current post.

After the election last fall he has found himself awkwardly close to the country's foremost political drama. His younger brother, Goran Granic, has ended up on the other side of the political trenches as one of the government's most prominent opponents, elected mayor of the capital, Zagreb, by the opposition parties. The choice of the foreign minister's brother for such a position was something that the country's president, Franjo Tudjman, long refused to approve.

"I am certain that a solution will be found to the dispute about the mayor," Mate Granic said diplomatically.

"Following the Dayton peace agreement I am optimistic for the first time. Now I really believe that we can achieve peace and cooperation," he said.

Will it gradually prove possible to introduce democracy in Croatia? "Our situation is definitely not ideal. War is not the best background for developing democracy, but we have come a long way," he said.

Croatia: Commentary on Bosniaks' Desire To Dominate

AU0603151496 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 6 Mar 96 p 2

[Commentary by Mate Piskor: "Doubt About Bosniaks' Sincerity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From Mostar to Sarajevo. The circle of efforts by "the friends" of the Federation to sink the idea that is in the interest of both peoples — the Croats and the Muslims — is slowly closing. It has transpired that the Federation of the Croats and Bosniaks, as a state community, has come in handy to many only as an opportunity for respite before new endeavors and objectives. The Federation was accepted not so much out of desire as because the world wanted it so. Imposed solutions, even though they may be the best ones, inevitably breed suspicion and generate problems.

The line of misunderstanding is easy to follow—Sarajevo, Mostar, Bugojno, Travnik, Usora, Vares, one problem after another. In Sarajevo they are obstructing the return of the Croats to their apartments, in Bugojno Mlaco's thugs continue to beat up the Croats, the Croats cannot as much as peep into Vares, a Muslim division is being formed in Usora to demonstrate force in front of a couple hundred of Croats, and in Mostar they are persistently trying to establish a Muslim majority and simultaneously satanize the Croats and Croatia. On the occasion of Bosnia-Herzegovina independence day, the ceremonial speeches did not mention the Croats as the defenders of Bosnia at all, only the Muslim-Bosniaks were the liberators. Contrary to the provisions of the Washington and Dayton agreements, the Bosniaks are trying to organize Sarajevo as their own, one-people canton....

Increasingly frequently we hear the Muslim leaders's protests that Dayton is not the best solution for the Muslims, that Dayton solutions should be changed and adapted. How is all this to be accomplished without provoking universal wrath? By saying what the world wishes to hear and simultaneously making moves that match one's own vision of the problem. Thus, Haris Silajdzic, who until yesterday was the prime minister and definitely the second most influential politician after Izetbegovic, can openly state that he is a blatant opponent of the Federation without anyone accusing him of undermining the Federation. He can do so because he skillfully veils the rigid position with which he is buying the votes of the Muslims with the stories about democracy with which he is gaining the sympathy of the West. These are the words about Bosnia that the world wants to hear from Bosnia. Silajdzic says that the Federation, the way it is led by the Croats and the extremists in the Party of Democratic Action, is heading for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while he champions a civil, multiethnic, and multicultural state community.

How this looks in practice, the leaders of the SDA in Sarajevo have recently been demonstrating. Although Washington and Dayton documents state differently, they are pushing for an organizational arrangement for the Bosnia-Herzegovina capital that would lead to the complete disowning of all but the Muslims. Namely, with the help of the municipal assembly, the SDA is trying to organize a one-people canton, in which the majority party would have absolute authority. In Sarajevo, where the Muslims constitute the majority, the majority party always means the majority people, and strong assertion of one people at the expense of the other was definitely not what the creators of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation aspired to achieve. Also, this is definitely not the solution the Croats, as one of the constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina (and Sarajevo is a part of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina), can and will accept.

Why are the SDA officials doing this? It is difficult to get a straight answer because it always lurks behind the salvaging formula about the unified, multicultural, and multiethic state. However, the fact that the Mujahidin did not leave despite promises, that expellees are not allowed to return, that we can again hear how the Muslims will have it more difficult with the Croats than with the Serbs, indicate where an answer should be sought. In any case, the answer is a far cry from the professions about the equality and coexistence, from the premises on which the idea of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation was born and implemented, and an even further cry from the democracy that they all like to cite so much.

Croatia: Soldiers Accused of Atrocities Against Serbs

AU0603172896 Paris AFP in English
1706 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, March 6 (AFP) — Croatian army soldiers last August massacred seven elderly Serbs, burning two of them alive, in a village in southern Croatia, the Croatian branch of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights said Wednesday.

This was the first time this massacre, one of several reported by human rights organisations, had been made public, the committee said.

"The Croatian army entered the village of Poljice on August 12 ... Between 12:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. seven people were killed and 80 percent of the village burnt," the committee said, in a statement.

The seven people killed included 90-year-old Milka Pavlica and 75-year-old Marija Brkljac, both burnt alive in their house, the committee said.

Staka Curcic, 45, and 89-year-old Rade Sunajko were shot dead, it added.

The committee said it could not determine how 60-year-old Petar Lavrinic, 93-year-old Sava Lavrinic and 86-year-old Milka Sunjako were killed because of the "advanced state of decomposition" of their bodies.

According to the organisation, 198 people lived in Poljice, close to the town of Udbina, before the Croatian army launched its operation to retake the rebel Serb Krajina region from Serbs on August 4 last year.

The Croatians officially ended the operation on August 7.

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman declared that those Serbs who had not participated in the rebellion against Zagreb "will have nothing to fear for their lives or their houses."

On February 23, the UN Security Council expressed concern about the fate of Croatia's Serb minority.

In a non-binding statement, the Security Council said it "remains deeply concerned at the situation of those refugees from the republic of Croatia who wish to return. It condemns the fact that effective measures have not so far been taken in that respect."

The statement also expressed concern about "isolated incidents of killings and other violations of human rights" in Croatia, despite a reduction in the incidence of the violations.

Around 180,000 Serbs fled the region during the operation.

Croatia: Baranja Soldiers Help Settle Refugees

AU0603154496 Beli Manastir Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine in Serbo-Croatian
1915 GMT 4 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We defended Baranja. It is now free, its defense lines are safe and stable, civilian authorities have been established, and closer economic, cultural, and other cooperation is being established with economists and institutions of our mother country. In the peace zone of Baranja, given consistent human rights and protection of property, there is hope for thousands of Serb refugees from western parts of the Krajina. They must be provided with the necessary conditions to begin a new life in this region within the set deadline.

This, among other things, was the subject of discussion at a forum held in Branjina that was organized by the Baranja soldiers' union and the joint local soldiers' committee of Branjina, Dajici, Draza, and Podolje. Soldiers accepted special tasks from the program for settlement of refugees and displaced persons from western parts of the Krajina to the territory of the Beli Manastir municipality as their patriotic duty and will persist until the program is fully carried out.

[Unidentified soldiers' union representative] We had to supply people with the strength and ability to implement that which was agreed on; that is, to check the housing available in local communities, to see whether the housing is habitable, if they are to be given to refugees, and if not, to see what needs to be done to fix them. Also, we must see what farms are available in each local community that could be used by refugees, interview people to find out what they need for a more efficient settlement. Perhaps they need machinery, reproduction material for the upcoming sowing, and other things. [end soldier's remarks]

In their sessions held in Jagodnjak, Ugljes, Batina, Knezevo, Popovac, and tonight in Baranja Petrovo Selo and Branjina, soldiers emphasized that Baranja is even stronger now that it has the refugees, but that in peacetime that strength must be used to create a dignified life for all citizens. That is why all those who regard everything as grist to their mill, profiteers who see to their own not national interest, must be brought to justice. Baranja soldiers will be adamant and take concrete steps against that. [passage omitted]

Thanks to special involvement of union activists in all soldier's local committees, this week the union will submit to the judicial branch all documentation on atrocities committed by the Ustashas on the territory of Baranja. The soldiers' union, which mostly discussed settlement, implementation of the Erdut agreement, demilitarization of the Srijem-Baranja district, cooperation with the UN peace forces and UNTAES [United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] will have a meeting in Darda tomorrow at 1800 [1700 GMT] hours, and later on in some ten major towns of Baranja as well.

Croatia: 'Crimes' Against Krajina Serbs Reported

LD0603220796 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2126 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, March 6 (TANJUG) — Croatia's Helsinki Committee for Human Rights has discovered traces of Croatian crimes against Krajina Serbs most likely committed after the Croatian Army aggression against the republic of Serb Krajina.

The remains of an old woman, Sava Lavrnic, 93, and her son Petar, 63, have been found in the village of Komic, near Titova Korenica on March 2, committee executive director Petar Mrkalj said in Zagreb.

They were found in a yard located beside the house of Marija Brkac, 75, an old woman who died in the fire that consumed her house.

Mrkalj said that Croatian Army units entered the village without meeting any resistance on 12 August 1995. Only 12 Serbs had remained in the village out of the initial 190 village inhabitants. Eye-witnesses said that Croats killed seven of them while the other five found shelter in a nearby forest.

Mrkalj said that Staka Curcic, 45, Mika Pavelica, 90, Rade Sunajko, 88, and Mika Sunajko, 75, had also been killed.

About 250,000 Serbs were driven away from their homes in an aggression by the Croatian Army against the northern and southern parts of the republic of Serb Krajina in August last year.

The Croatian Army bombed Serb refugee convoys and U.N. observers issued repeated warnings days after the aggression that remaining Serbs, mainly the old, were being murdered by Croats.

The committee visited a mass grave in Banija, northern Krajina. Eye-witnesses said that the Serbs killed in the offensive had been there. There are 79 wooden crosses marked "Unknown" at the mass grave.

Mrkalj said that on the basis of the latest discoveries he believed that there were around 5,000 graves with identified or unidentified bodies in Krajina.

During a visit to Croatian Kostajnica, the committee was informed that a bomb had been hurled into the yard of Danilo Rapajic, 61, and his wife Otilija, 60, late on February 27. Fire from automatic weapons was opened at the house which was also hit by a shell.

Croatia: Tomcic on Tudjman's Dictatorial 'Tone'

AU0703095396 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian
23 Feb 96 pp 2-4

[Interview with Zlatko Tomcic, president of the Croatian Peasants' Party and leader of the joint opposition of Croatia, by Djurdjica Klancir; place and date not given: "President Tudjman Accuses the Opposition of Imprisonable Crimes: Does That Mean We Can Expect To Be Arrested?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Klancir] Last week you said that you had been informed that President Tudjman would not confirm the appointment of Jozo Rados as the mayor of Zagreb, and that has now been confirmed by the statement from his office. Did you personally expect that he would nevertheless be accepted?

[Tomcic] Perhaps in the words of some HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] officials one could discern some improvement, some possibility that he would nevertheless be accepted, but it quite soon became clear that this would not happen. Personally I had some moral doubts as to whether we had acted in the right way with regard to Goran Granic when we decided to put forward another candidate, namely Jozo Rados. With his move President Tudjman granted amnesty to Goran Granic, but he also thoroughly disclosed the policy of the HDZ with regard to Zagreb—the HDZ does not want any opposition candidates for the mayoral post, neither Granic, nor Rados, nor anybody else, and they will use any method they please to remove the candidates.

[Klancir] The statement from the president's office confirmed two opposition candidates for the deputy governors [podzupan] of the Zagreb district [zupanija]: Bozidar Pankretic from the HSS [Croatian Peasants' Party] and Igor Dekanic from the HNS [Croatian People's Party]. Eduard Kunjko from the HND [Croatian Independent Democrats] has not been confirmed....

[Tomcic] The HDZ is obviously trying to again bring discord into the opposition. It seems that the HSS and HSN have gotten a small discount. But we are not politically naive, and we do not want to take the bait of the HDZ.

[Klancir] So what will the opposition do after this decision of the president? Will it dissolve the city assembly?

[Tomcic] The law, unfortunately, does not precisely define the possible developments, and there are different interpretations. The opposite sides obviously cannot agree on the next procedures. In the first place, as he did not confirm Jozo Rados, the president can name his mayor. The assembly, which has been legally elected and constituted, has the right to either accept or not accept the mayor candidate. The law anticipates that the government, if the assembly does not accept the president's candidate, can dissolve the assembly. There is, however, the question of what will happen if the government does not dissolve the assembly. According to some interpretations, the entire procedure is repeated — the assembly nominates its candidate once again, and so on. In other words, there is a possibility that this entire process could be repeated endlessly.

Two Possibilities

According to other interpretations, the government is obliged to dissolve the assembly. But in fact it is not important which variant we in the opposition believe to be correct. It is already known how the HDZ will act. This is how they will buy time until they decide it is the right point for local elections in both Zagreb and the entire country. I do not know whether in that case the HDZ has in mind the critical date, 1 April, when the temporary budget for the financing of the city of Zagreb expires. Regarding the fact that the city assembly of Zagreb does not accept the documents made in the presidential residence, i.e. does not accept Branko Miksa as the mayor, it is very probable that the budget proposal for 1996 will not be passed. And if on 1 April there is no document on the budget for the city of Zagreb, the government will have to dissolve the city assembly and name its commissary. But obviously it all boils down to the HDZ's tactics of procrastination.

[Klancir] But what will the opposition undertake?

[Tomcic] Now we have indeed reached absurdity.... It is inadmissible for the mayor to be elected in that way. We have been very patient, and, because of our responsibility to the voters, we have tried to find a solution that is as painless as possible. However, we have reached the wall, and we must no longer accept the HDZ's game of procrastination. My personal attitude and the attitude of the HSS is that it would be most honest if these two opposition candidates, Bozidar Pankretic and Igor Dekanic, whom the president has accepted, do not take up their duties, i.e. resign. And then as soon as possible, if it comes to the dissolution of the assembly! This is for one very simple reason: We definitely have to explain to the citizens of Zagreb that we are not able to carry out what they wanted, that we have been prevented from creating executive authorities according to the results of their voting. Now it is definitely clear. The HDZ is to be blamed for that, because

it only wants to accept its own mayor. They still wish to hide the facts about how they have managed the city up to now!

But we have to consider another possibility. The two opposition candidates for the post of the deputy governor can take up their duties — because they have indeed been elected by the city assembly, and President Tudjman has confirmed them.

Formally, they have been deputy governors since 17 February. Of course, those people are now responsible for the functioning of the Zagreb district. The opposition must not be irresponsible, and it is important for this problem to be resolved painlessly, to neutralize possible consequences of their refusal to take up their duties.

[Klancir] That second variant once more announces the readiness of the opposition to undertake further negotiations with the HDZ?

[Tomcic] No, the opposition parties will consider that possibility only because of the responsibility we feel to the citizens. But I repeat, the attitude of the presidency of the HSS is that it is time for the assembly to be dissolved We will suggest that solution to the joint opposition, but, as usual, the majority will decide.

[Klancir] How do you interpret the fact that the government has accepted the candidature of Jozo Rados, but that President Tudjman ignored the suggestion of his government?

[Tomcic] In the statement from the president's office there are very strange formulations as to whom the government recommends and whom not. About Rados it says: "Concerning the proposal of the Government of the Republic of Croatia," the president, "in order to secure the regular functioning of the executive authorities of the City of Zagreb," has made the decision to "refuse to confirm the appointment of Jozo Rados," and about Kunjak it decidedly says that "at the proposal of the government".... Now who would know what is hidden behind the formulation "concerning the proposal?" Did the government support the nomination of Rados, or not?

[Klancir] Judging from the words of the deputy prime minister, Borislav Skegro, on BBC, the government supported Jozo Rados!

[Tomcic] Of course I know what Skegro said. According to the information I have, the answer of the government was: We do not oppose the nomination of Jozo Rados. And if it is true that the government did not oppose the appointment of Jozo Rados, then, reading this statement, it can clearly be seen that they wish to hide that. In other words, they wish to hide the fact that even in the HDZ there are different opinions concernig a solution to the crisis in Zagreb! Probably part of the HDZ leadership felt that they were getting into a mess: At first they so passionately claimed that they could not accept Goran Granic only because of some secret plans that he allegedly wrote, but that this by no means meant that they could not accept anybody else from the opposition, and now they do not accept Rados, either.... The intention of the HDZ to impose their own mayor, despite the will of the majority of Zagreb's citizens, has been completely disclosed!

"There Is No Breakup in the Joint Opposition"

[Klancir] Is the opposition ready for a resolution to the crisis in Zagreb? In the Sabor, the SDP [Social Democratic Party], after the discussion on revision for 1994, voted in favor of the HDZ's conclusion, together with the HDZ and the HSP [Croatian Party of Rights], and you seriously objected to that. On the other hand, [leader of the SDP] Ivica Racan attacked you in his interview with SLOBODNA DALMACIJA.... One gets the impression that the coalition of seven opposition parties has started to break up.

[Tomcic] I still believe that the SDP's voting in favor of the HDZ's conclusion on revision was a bad move, but I repeat that that move did not bring about any major tectonic shifts in the association of opposition parties. Despite the fact that I respect the right of every party to vote as it deems appropriate, and regardless of the fact that we have not agreed on any joint action concerning revision, I believe that the conclusion of the HSS, in which we insist on carrying out the revision both in the Defense Ministry and in the Interior Ministry, and on the revisions of all funds, primarily the fund for retired and invalid people for the period from 1991 to 1994, is much better that the HDZ's conclusion. That conclusion is not clear enough and does not mention the problem of the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry. I am sorry that my statement, in which I said how amazed I was at the decision of the SDP to vote for the HDZ's solution, offended some otherwise very experienced politicians in the SDP. In his interview with FERAL TRIBUNE, Jurjevic called my behavior a tragedy, and told me that I should rather worry about what goes on in my own party concerning the terrain — he mentions Omis, Varazdin.... As for Racan's interview in SLOBODNA DALMACIJA, I have been informed that he denied the part that talks about the HSS and the liberals. Indeed, there is no breakup in the joint opposition: We still cooperate normally.

[Klancir] So you think that the evaluations that the SDP could become closer to the HDZ in Zagreb are not true?

[Tomcic] I believe that the SDP, as with all of us in the opposition, wishes to fulfill the will of the majority of Zagreb citizens. Perhaps there has been some flirtation on the part of some individuals with the HDZ, but to be honest that can be found in nearly all parties. The opposition is nevertheless still unified.

President's Letter

[Klancir] In his letter addressed to the opposition, President Tudjman accuses the entire opposition of "discrediting, destabilizing, and removing the democratically elected authorities...."

[Tomcic] Yes, he was very strict with us.... There is a question, though, whether he has the right to do that. Once again he tried to teach us how to behave, and what, in fact, we should do. Nobody but he knows the only right way to behave! That is an inadmissible attitude for the president of a state that wishes to be democratic. We do our work seriously, and he cannot attack and insult us without any argument. Tudjman's letter hides a number of dangers, and I hope that in his vicinity there are still some people who will dare to tell him that. He directly accused the leaders of the opposition parties, and the parties themselves, of collaborating with the enemy from the outside and of working for the overthrow of the constitutional system in Croatia! And that means that he is accusing us of deeds for which one can be sent to prison. And what now? Does that mean that we can really expect to be arrested? Will we be tried? Personally, regardless of the terrifying tone of that letter, I still believe that it is nothing but a scarecrow, as there are no grounds for those accusations.

[Klancir] Isn't the problem with the letter something more than just "a scarecrow?" Aren't you afraid that it will cause much bigger political problems? After all, your potential voters, at prime time, on state television, listened to the words of the president, who claims that you wish to overturn the democratically elected authorities!

[Tomcic] Of course we cannot view all the consequences of this letter from the president at this moment.... No, I do not wish to underestimate it, by no means. The letter was written in the kind of tone that the president of a democratic state cannot afford to use. That is a tone that pushes us into dictatorship. I believe that the letter was written in anger.... Of course, it is disputable whether a state president can afford such anger. The opposition directly opposed his wish to have yet another of his many men, who see him off at the airport.... We had to answer that letter with another open letter — quite clearly we warned him that his non-democratic behavior, his groundless attacks on the opposition, harm the international reputation of Croatia!

The Frightening Game

[Klancir] This letter from the president is an answer to the public letter that the opposition addressed to him at the beginning of February. You asked the president to contribute to a positive resolution to the crisis related to the election of executive authorities, through his own action and decisions based his constitutional and legal competences.... Why did you decide to write that letter in the first place?

[Tomcic] As soon as the crisis related to the election of the mayor of Zagreb started, the HDZ formed a working group consisting of Pasalic, Milas, Greguric, and Valentic. On the other hand, I was there as the coordinator for communications with the leaders of opposition parties. But we have not managed to agree on any important question. We only agreed, at our proposal, that a code of conduct, for behavior between parties, should be made. We realized that in communication with the HDZ's working group we were not able to find a solution, and we decided to write that letter.

[Klancir] Does that mean that in your talks with the members of the working group you realized that the HDZ's attitude on the issue of the mayor is exclusively formed by the president himself?

[Tomcic] They never hid that. In fact they always only competed among themselves as to which one of them would bring the good news to the president. And the only good news for him was — an HDZ mayor. So we decided to address him with a very decent, serious letter, in which we appealed for his cooperation in resolving the crisis. And now we have been groundlessly accused as anti-state elements. Personally I was shocked when I heard that letter. I do not allow anybody, not even the state president, to label me without any evidence as one who has been destroying this state. If all that is nothing but a political game, then it is very an uncomely and frightening game.

[Klancir] One expected President Tudjman — if he did not accept Jozo Rados, and he did not — would instantly name his own mayor. How do you interpret the fact that he has still not done that?

[Tomcic] He has only been buying time, with his creators of Zagreb policy. It is not in his interest to be fast, because he wishes to delay the elections as long as possible. He is waiting for the optimal conditions to be created for the success of the HDZ in Zagreb.

[Klancir] When, in your opinion, could the elections in Zagreb be held?

[Tomcic] In October of this year at the latest. That deadline will by all means be determined by the crisis that will escalate after 1 April, once there is no more budget. Until that time the HDZ wishes to prepare the changes and additions to the Law on Local Self-Rule, but also to the Electoral Law. Probably the proportional part will decrease further, and the majority part increase further. [sentence as published] In the same way, we have found out that there have been some considerations made to changing the borders of the districts, but also to abolishing the House of Districts in the parliament. To me personally the information on abolishing the House of Districts does not seem realistic, but changes to the Law on Local Rule and Self-Rule, as well as to the Electoral Law, are quite certain. I believe that the sessions have been so densely scheduled in order for those legal changes to be passed.

[Klancir] Are you convinced of a repeat triumph for the opposition in Zagreb, despite the changes in the laws?

[Tomcic] Yes! Attacks such as this letter only incite the citizens to stay with us. It is important to already now insist on the international observation of the elections in Zagreb.

[Klancir] In Sabor the HSS particularly insisted on the revision of the work of the Defense Ministry.

[Tomcic] Because the Defense Ministry is the biggest consumer of the budget. We admit that no revision could be made in the course of "Flash" or "Storm" military operations, but we do not want that ministry to be forgotten, nor the Interior Ministry, particularly because there have been many rumors concerning alleged abuses in the Defense Ministry. We want a competent institution only to examine that.

[Klancir] As a member of the Sabor's Board for National Security, you have had insight into the document on abuses in the Defense Ministry, prepared by three members of the SIS. You were requested to return the material, the contents of which one can only guess?

[Tomcic] Yes, academician Pavletic asked me to return that written material, so I returned it to the Board for Internal Policy and National Security. In fact, it was written by three former officers. It is true that the contents were written on more than 200 pages, some of which are marked as top secret. Until the allegations from it are examined, I do not wish to say anything about the details.

[Klancir] According to some information, in the report there are also some allegations of abuse that can by no means be marked top secret. Do you agree with the decision that not even such abuses may be disclosed?

[Tomcic] About some parts of the report it can really be said that they cannot be designated top secret, but the entire document is an integral whole, which I have to respect.

Croatia: New Army District Divisions Detailed

AU0703095996 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Feb 96 p 8

[Article by Damir Dukic: "Ston Will Defend Croatia's South!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The new army district division of the Republic of Croatia, announced by Minister of Defense Gojko Susak at the session of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] Main Board last Saturday, is the first significant reorganization of the military districts in the independent Croatian state. Former military districts, formed in a short period and in the combat confusion, functioned throughout the war with only minor superficial interventions of aesthetic kind (for example, Gospic has come in place of Rijeka, and operational zones have been renamed into regional corps), which was also a proof of circumspection in their formation.

However, the arrival of peace in this territory demands their reorganization, just like the change of relations on the outer Croatian borders demands a shift in the center of gravity of defense. The organization of new army districts, apart from that, fits into the implementation of the peacetime reorganization of the Croatian Army and its modernization.

In tailoring the new division of the army districts, consideration has been given, of course, to the geo-political conditions, surroundings, and to the possibilities of more operational activity. Besides, economic reasons have been respected, as well as the traditional and historical ones. The number of army districts has remained the same — the former military and territorial division had six of them, and the new one will organize the same number. However, by the reorganization, northern Croatia will lose one army district, and southern Croatia will get one more. That is, instead of Zagreb, Bjelovar, Osijek, Gospic, Karlovac, and Split, the command bases of the new army districts will be situated in Djakovo, Varazdin, Karlovac, Knin, and Ston. So, one notices immediately the shift of bases from large centers to smaller towns, and their movement toward the borders.

Knin Is Ideal

Certainly the most interesting of all the new seats of the army districts is Ston, a small town with absolutely no military plants, if we do not count the location of the transmitter Rota. Moreover, there are no adequate facilities to move the command into, much less a larger number of soldiers. However, if one wanted to respect the adopted principles, there was no other choice, so that Ston is in fact the ideal solution for the far south of Croatia.

It has proved utterly necessary to form a separate army district in the territory of southern Dalmatia, which was the concept that has been tirelessly supported by the former local commander General Nojko Marinovic. General Marinovic has recently been retired, but his idea has been put into action. The only remaining question is where to put the command of the army district. The headquarters could not be situated in Dubrovnik, the only larger town (moreover, large groups of uniformed persons will not be allowed to enter the town, apart from — IFOR [Implementation Force] members!?) because of extensive tourism. Konavle is too far away, just like Ploce, which is, besides, situated on the right bank of the river Neretva.

On the other hand, tourism in Ston is not very developed, the town is situated in an almost closed bay, it is close to the mythical Cepikuce, and to the Bosnian-Serb entity. And one more thing, the small Ston successfully resisted the large aggression of JNA [Yugoslav Peoples' Army]. This district would cover the area from the river Neretva to Prevlaka, so, what has been the zone of responsibility of the southern battleground, too. For the time being, the name of the future commander remains unknown. It could happen that the former deputy commander in Dubrovnik, Colonel Ivica Tolic, who was appointed to that position after the sudden departure of General Zivko Budimir for the chief of staff of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], remains in that office.

The situation with Knin was crystal clear. Even before its liberation it was known that the Split command would move over there. The town is exceptionally suitable for the accommodation of troops and command, has excellent conditions, and "covers" all Dalmatian towns. The Knin army district would control long borders, all the way from the river Neretva to the depths of Lika. However, the job has been facilitated here, because it relies in the good part on the region of Herzeg-Bosnia. The command in Knin should be taken over by the former commander of the Split regional corps, General Ante Gotovina, unless he is appointed to an even higher office.

Sensitive Djakovo

Most of the former Gospic regional corps moves to Pazin, a part will fall to Knin, and a bit also to Karlovac. Although for some the appointing of Pazin as the headquarters of an army district was a surprise, Istria needed the organization into a separate army district just like the Dubrovnik seaboard. In looking for headquarters, there was not much to choose from, just as in the case of Dubrovnik. Although the administrative seat of the County of Istria is not abundant in adequate military plants, Pazin simply imposed itself as the only choice possible. Since the center of gravity of defense is no longer turned eastward, the zone of responsibility, will probably be reduced to Istria, Gorski kotar, and a part of Lika. The new Pazin commander will be the former head of the Gospic regional corps, Major General Mirko Norac.

Karlovac is the only of all the former seats of the army districts which will remain the seat in the future. Its role in the defensive positioning of the country is vital. The town and the whole region of a rich warrior's and military history has an exceptional significance. The zone of its responsibility extends to the south toward Gospic, and to the north toward the river Sava. That is, except for a part of responsibility of the Gospic regional corps, Karlovac will also take over some of the former Zagreb army territory. The former commander of the Karlovac regional corps, major general Miljenko Crnjac will most likely continue to hold that office.

Varazdin, too, will become the seat of an army district according to the new organization, by which it will replace Bjelovar and Zagreb in the north of Croatia. The Bjelovar headquarters has already been moved to Varazdin, and a part of the Zagreb regional corps is also moving. Varazdin will take the wide area along the border with Slovenia and Hungary within its responsibility. Major General Luka Dzanko from Bjelovar, or Major General Marijan Marekovic from Zagreb, whose part of the corps has been moving to Sisak, could move into the Varazdin commander's office.

The most sensitive area will fall to Djakovo, a town in the heart of Slavonia, equally (and sufficiently) far away from the eastern, the northern, and the southern border on the river Sava. The Osijek command, headed by General Djuro Decak moves into Djakovo. They will control the whole eastern border along the river Danube, and the one along the river Sava toward Bosnia. The proximity of Djakovo to those borders indicates the wish for activity to be as operational as possible.

Tradition of HRM

The Croatian Navy [HRM] follows the traditional division into the northern, middle, and southern Adriatic. The former commander, rear Admiral Ante Budimir, will remain at the head of the naval sector in Pula. Sibenik will, as a natural wartime harbor, be given the command of the middle Adriatic, which the inhabitants of Sibenik really deserved with their contribution in the Liberation War. Apart from that, the wartime harbor Lora will also be disburdened. The command of the southern naval sector will stay in Ploce, and it will cover the whole coastal area from the slopes of Biokovo Mountain to Cape Ostro. Frigate captain Ante Urlic will remain in command in Ploce.

One should also emphasize that the new army district division does not envisage changing the residence of the central headquarters. Thus the General Staff of the HV [Croatian Army] will stay in Zagreb, while the HRM Command will remain in the Split harbor Lora.

Croatia: Company To Build Four Cargo Ships for Iran

LD0603210096 Zagreb HTV Television
in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian shipbuilders are to construct four multipurpose cargo ships over the next 27 months for Iranian consignees, each with a capacity of almost 22,000 gross registered tonnes. The total value of the order is $109,000,000. The supplier of the ships is the Brodo-Split company, but two of the ships will be built in the Uljanik shipbuilding yard in Pula. Under the agreement signed in 1994, the ships will be paid for in oil as set out in the agreement between the Croatian National Bank and the Iranian Central Bank. The letter of intent which regulates relations between the business partners involved in the construction was signed by Minister of Economy Davor Stern, INA [Croatian oil industry] director Andrija Kojakovic, and Mladen Corluk, director of the department for new projects. The agreed deposit of $20 million is guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance.

It is expected that the agreement will come into force in the coming month.

Poland: Deputy Defense Minister on NATO, Policies

WS0603144096 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 5 Mar 96 pp 1, 4

[Article by Andrzej Medykowski: "Washington, Brussels, Athens, Warsaw; Horizons of Security"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The distance separating us from the security and economic structures of the West is huge, and the expected dates of admitting Poland into the EU, NATO, and the Western European Union [WEU] are rather distant. Considering the formal requirements and procedures, it should be kept in mind that in the near future we will have to solicit the support of about a dozen states whose representatives will vote for our membership. We thus need to demonstrate our strengths and must dispel any doubts that may arise.*

Polish politicians and members of parliament have frequent contacts with Western partners. This already creates a propitious atmosphere and lays the ground for further cooperation.

The United States: Our Closest Partner

We have the closest relations with the United States. Our politicians and military representatives travel across the Atlantic very often.

"I had very meaningful talks at the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and the National War College. All of these talks were very precise: My interlocutors inquired about projects and operations preparing us for the negotiations on entering NATO, which are to be launched after the decision [on the expansion of the alliance] is made in December," said First Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka after his most recent U.S. visit. "Fortunately, I was adequately 'loaded' with ideas, plans, and information on what has been accomplished since the appointment of the new defense minister and on currently implemented projects."

"Spicy" Discussions

During his visit to the United States, Deputy Defense Minister Karkoszka took part in a symposium on the enlargement of NATO and the Partnership for Peace program.

The participation of states that are inimical toward our aspirations or that are against the enlargement of NATO added some "spice" to the entire debate. The routine arguments of the Russians and other states were reverberated.

The basic problems remain the same: the introduction of civilian control over the Armed Forces and proving that we are a full-fledged democracy.

"Once the current plans of the Defense Ministry [MON] to pass new laws are implemented and the new constitution becomes effective, the process of establishing a democratic system will be completed in the defense sphere.

"It is important to retain certain standards within the Armed Forces—training, infrastructure, etc. This naturally requires outlays to satisfy basic needs related to adapting to NATO standards over the next five years.

"It is extremely important to maintain friendly relations with our neighbors in the entire subregion. Poland is perceived as a positive element in the geostrategic situation," stressed the deputy minister.

Report or Margin

"The majority of my interlocutors, both within and outside the administration, have not heard about the report prepared for the U.S. Congress that has caused such an uproar in Poland," said Andrzej Karkoszka. "Having read the report, I am deeply convinced that the authors wanted to prove they do see all the positive processes, while at the same time offering some valid criticism. The short text lists more praise than reproof.

"The entire issue is minor, and the treatment it was given by the Polish media is grotesque. Our partners see this exactly the way we do. Naturally, the shortcomings that were pointed out do provide a lesson the Ministry of National Defense will seriously look into," said the deputy minister.

A Bird's-Eye View

The public usually receives only bits and pieces of information on our integration attempts. It is worth looking at them from a wider perspective. This is what Andrzej Karkoszka says:

"I take a bird's-eye view of the issue, and I can say one thing: We have several huge projects we are implementing as part of a larger operation; we called it the 'National Project of Integration With NATO.' It remains very general and was presented by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Towpik during talks with NATO. It was developed primarily by MON and will now be made more specific."

It is worth noting that this project was developed on the basis of the Individual Partnership Project within Partnership for Peace. Several hundred operations have been planned for this year for staffs, units, and institutions within the defense system.

MON-Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Full Coordination

"Whenever I go on a foreign visit, I am fully 'armed' with materials prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ]. The MSZ can always count on receiving materials on our purely military activities," stresses Deputy Minister Karkoszka. "There is full coordination in the field of security policy. The MSZ has a leading role as far as defining the major trends of our activities is concerned. Our institutional and personal relations are excellent, and all problems are solved as they arise."

Partnership

Bilateral cooperation: We have 1,600 projects planned for 1996—visits, seminars, exchanges, training, etc. The majority will take place in the United States, but many will also be in Germany, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and other partner countries.

Attaining compatibility: The Planning and Reviewing Program [Program Planowania i Przegladu], a project targeted at attaining compatibility with NATO by selected units, is a very important element.

The first unit selected to cooperate with NATO is the 16th Airborne Battalion, currently stationed in Bosnia. This year, the staff of the 6th Assault Brigade is to reach the same level of compatibility, followed by the staffs of two divisions, the regiments of these divisions, and so on. Next year we will try to prepare a hospital and an emergency rescue squadron. The entire process is to last up to the year 2000.

Defense planning: We want to incorporate cost accounting into the financing system of the Armed Forces and the defense system. We will thus clearly see what everything costs—for example, training, accommodation, health care, equipment for each soldier and battalion, barracks, specific operations. Adapting to NATO accounting standards will enable us to simulate allocations of funds as projects and defense needs arise.

This project prepares us for filling out a questionnaire on the defense budget. Such questionnaires are filled out by each allied state and sent to Brussels, where they become the basis for joint planning for the alliance's needs.

Standardization and normalization: We have to implement a package of laws and norms developed by the states integrated within NATO. There are about 1,200 of them, plus an approximate 2,000 technical regulations of various sorts. We have to incorporate them into our defense strategy and in the military if we are to be a fully efficient partner. A lengthy process of introducing NATO methods, procedures, and products to Polish norms lies ahead.

Problems related to infrastructure: Every country cooperating with NATO has to have basic elements of infrastructure in place so as to enable the permanent or temporary military presence of allied forces—for example, for the duration of military exercises. We have to develop such an infrastructure so that it meets certain standards. (This is perhaps one of the top priorities of NATO states). Even if we do not become a member of the alliance, we want joint exercises, flights, etc. to be carried out in Poland with NATO soldiers.

Managing airspace: We have to adapt our system of managing airspace to Western standards by unifying the civilian and military system (joint management) and including it in the West European system—within which it would be possible to communicate with all of our neighbors. Specific action is a result of President Bill Clinton's initiative. We have very broad cooperation with the four states of the Visegrad Group. The financial support declared by President Clinton amounted to less in the end, yet for Poland the cuts were the lowest, in relative terms.

"The Americans are our most supportive partners. Whenever joint operations are carried out—for example, military exercises in which the United States takes part—we always receive substantial financial aid," Deputy Minister Karkoszka stresses.

We Are Not Security Consumers

Deputy Minister Karkoszka also paid a visit to Greece. "Greece is a very important partner for us—it is a member of the EU, NATO, and the WEU. It lies in the Balkan region, which is posing a threat for the security and stability of Europe," he says.

"Poland supports stability in the Balkans, which Greece is very interested in. By sending our battalion to Bosnia and covering all the high costs this entailed, we have proved that we want stability in the region, that we are a reliable partner who understands that European security is undivided, and who is actively involved in retaining it. The Greeks welcomed this with satisfaction. We are not merely a consumer of security but an active co-originator.

"We do see, however, that representatives of the Greek Foreign and Defense Ministries fear the redisposition [redyspozycja] of EU and NATO funds. If the attention of major Western states is focused on Central European states instead of on Mediterranean issues, the effects on the interests of Greece and other south European states will be harmful. There is, of course, a certain conflict of interest, but this issue is hardly surprising. We have presented our conflicting interests, but I can assure that once the time comes to vote, Greece will not hesitate to say yes," stressed Andrzej Karkoszka.

"I have also explained to our Greek partners that we will heavily invest in those areas that bring us closer to the Western security system. When the decision on our membership in NATO is made, capital will not have to be relocated to investments in Poland. The current political situation does not require this. We do not need huge investments in infrastructure. We do not need the urgent presence of foreign troops. Our situation is very different from that of Greece when it was joining NATO during the Cold War.

"The Greeks also presented their problems, their conflict with Turkey. Poland's stance is that conflicts should be solved by peaceful methods and that the status quo in Europe should not be upset—a provision of all of the basic international agreements in Europe. For Poland this is the absolute foundation of European stability.

"Briefly speaking, we have long-lasting cultural ties, the two nations have friendly relations, there are no major conflicts between us," Andrzej Karkoszka emphasized.

Poland: Council Head on Local Government Reform

WS0603155596 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5 Mar 96 p 3

[Interview with Leszek Miller, head of the Office of the Polish Council of Ministers, by Malgorzata Subotic and Renata Wrobel; place and date not given: "It Is More Difficult to Show Off Here"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [RZECZPOSPOLITA] Why have you come to work in the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM]?

[Miller] I have come to URM to complete what my predecessor in office began; I am talking about the reform of URM itself. Another reason I have come here is that I want to deal with the problems that were brought up in the past. I primarily mean the territorial reform, what is traditionally called the strengthening of self-government and the strengthening of the position of voivodes.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] You want to liquidate URM, establish a ministry of administration, and introduce the second level of the territorial self-government and regions. Is that right?

[Miller] Yes, it is.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Did you assume the office of the URM head because you decided that the issues your predecessors dealt with can finally be concluded?

[Miller] There will never be a good time to make decisions regarding a new administrative division of the country. However, should we just do nothing because of that?

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] When members of the Sejm commission were interviewing you as a candidate for URM head, journalists calculated that, for over an hour, you did not even once say the word "powiat" [an administrative unit, larger than a gmina, which may be reestablished]. Deputy Krzysztof Janik (Democratic Left Alliance) said in a television program that he did not understand this and that he hoped this would be a linguistic problem, not a real issue. What kind of problem is it, and have you resolved it yet?

[Miller] It was the first time I had publicly discussed this issue. Of course, at such a moment one has many more doubts. Today I know a bit more, even though this is still too little to feel fully competent. However, it seems to me that a self-governmental gmina [smallest administrative unit] plus a big powiat and a big voivodship is the right idea.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] You stated publicly that establishment of the second self-governmental level is a foregone conclusion. Might it be some other level, not the powiat?

[Miller] It might be the same as what the Sejm has received—the proposal of establishing 49 self-governmental voivodships.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] How do you evaluate this draft law, submitted by the Polish Peasant Party?

[Miller] As I see it, it has one defect: It perpetuates the status quo. I believe we should make efforts to reform voiovodships.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] You declared on several occasions that this year would be devoted to discussions and analyses, whereas next year concrete decisions regarding territorial reform might be made.

[Miller] This depends on when we are ready to make such decisions.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Deputy Janik, chairman of the extraordinary commission that is preparing the reform, declares that the relevant draft laws may be ready as soon as the first half of the year.

[Miller] Judging by the rate in which decisions in these areas were made in the past, this opinion seems to be too optimistic to me.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Would the final decision be made by the present parliament or by the next one?

[Miller] I do not know when the elections will be held. If they are held in the fall of 1997, then it is natural that the decision will be made by this parliament. The same holds true if they are in the summer. If they are held early in the spring, then probably the decision will not be made by this parliament. The problem of the election campaign will appear; the campaign may either expedite or impede matters. How can it expedite things? It can help if this problem becomes one of the most important issues in parties' political platforms. [passage omitted]

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Are you personally an advocate of establishing powiats?

[Miller] I cannot look at powiats separately from certain other issues. To me, the establishment of powiats makes sense if we reform voivodships and make them look like organisms resembling macroregions. In large voivodships there is room for large powiats; the powiats must also be economically strong because only then does this make sense. Now, if we were to establish powiats in the currently existing voivodships, I believe it would be a bad idea.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] During the interviews in the Sejm, you supported establishing 17 or more than 20 voivodships. A few days later you began speaking about 12 voivodships. Why did you change your mind so quickly?

[Miller] I spoke to many people—politicians, experts, voivodes. I tried to form my own opinion on what configuration would be best.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Was it voivodes who tried to win you over to the idea of establishing 12 voivodships? After all, in such a situation as many as 37 of the present voivodships would cease to exist.

[Miller] Not all voivodes did this. I am not expecting unanimity on this matter. [passage omitted]

Poland: Conflict in SdRP, Political Implications Analyzed

96EP0033B Krakow CZAS KRAKOWSKI in Polish 15-21 Feb 96 p 6

[Article by KW: "Infighting in the SdRP; The Ex-Prime Minister Versus the President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation within the SdRP [Social Democrats of the Republic of Poland] is mainly described in terms of superficial conflicts manufactured for public consumption, such as the dispute over the independence of the OPZZ [All-Polish Alliance of Trade Unions], the dispute between former Minister of Labor Leszek Miller and Minister of Finance Grzegorz Kolodko, or the dispute between the party "hard-liners" and the party "liberals." By spreading such an image of their party, its leaders appeal to various, often markedly opposed, social groups. They present the image of a modern, internally pluralized, social-democratic party which has nothing in common with that totalitarian monolith, the former PZPR.

As for the actual infighting, it is being neither disclosed nor publicized, and concerns chiefly the strategy for changing the political scene and the extent of the influence of insider coteries in the apparatus of power. At present, the rivalry is between the entourage of Jozef Oleksy and the new presidential staff of Aleksander Kwasniewski. This dispute does not, however, seem to threaten the coherence and operating efficiency of the SdRP.

First, it concerns the extent of influence within the so-called power ministries—the Office of the Ministerial Council, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of National Defense. At the last-named ministry, the actual head is Deputy Minister Andrzej Karkoszka. He is responsible for the Task Force on Restructuring, that is, for changing the relationship between the General Staff and the civilian part of the ministry. Karkoszka, a former PZPR member and intelligence operative—who barely a few years ago was an unwelcome guest in certain NATO countries—who now wears the disguise of a civilian, nonpartisan minister, has the mission of bringing refractory generals back to the bosom of the SdRP. At the ministry, Karkoszka is in charge of contacts with both NATO and parliament. The official head of the ministry, Dobrzanski, is a figurehead, and his only way of gaining real influence would be a closer relationship between the PSL (Polish Peasant Party) and the generals interested in retaining their autonomy. But among the higher military commanders there is no shortage of those favoring rapprochement with Kwasniewski's presidential staff which, as they calculate, represents a lesser danger of loss of independence by the military than do the SdRP and Oleksy's group.

The dispute between the entourages of Oleksy and Kwasniewski is just as prominent at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where Colonel Anklewicz, Oleksy's man, is deputy to Minister Siemiatkowski. A professional, he had efficiently disorganized the work of the special services as early as during the presidential campaign, broadening, step by step, the influence of then Prime Minister Oleksy at that ministry. Paradoxically enough, in order to effectively oppose the SdRP's influence within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Kwasniewski and Siemiatkowski must now lean on Lech

Walesa's former men. It should also be borne in mind that the special services are naturally inclined to seek support from the most stable political center.

But as for Kwasniewski's control over the party apparatus, the situation is different. In this case the Oleksy-Miller duo predominates. In his capacity as the chief of the Office of the Ministerial Council, Miller is influential with the province governors and thus, at the same time, able to assist the provincial SdRP organizations. In this case the dispute will become exacerbated before the parliamentary elections, when the procedure for determining electoral lists will commence. For, then the names on these lists can be determined by the real power center, that is, the presidential staff. That is why even now Kwasniewski is urging that "concurrently with the parliament the members of our Constitutional Committee, which at the same time is the Constituent Assembly, be elected." Upon being elected by completely popular vote, such members would not be subject to intraparty pressures.

This is Kwasniewski's first strategic move of its kind. That is because the new constitution will be the main field of conflict. But as Kwasniewski has declared, there is no certainty as to whether it will be passed by the present parliament. At any rate, it certainly will not be passed without the support the PSL, a party that is consistently opposed to enhancing the power of the presidential staff. On this issue Oleksy and his associates will be the natural allies of Waldemar Pawlak. In other words, Kwasniewski's possibilities for guiding the work on the future constitution in the present parliament are quite limited.

Poland: Walesa Supporters Form Movement for Next Election

LD0603220396 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 6 Mar 96

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] Heads of Lech Walesa's provincial election staffs from his presidential campaign have set up a movement "In Solidarity in Elections." The movement is to prepare Lech Walesa's camp's victory in the parliamentary elections.

[Correspondent Lukasz Perzyna] The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] has been successful because it is an electoral committee always in action, leaders of the movement stressed. They recalled that the alliance of the Polish right, if it is created, has a chance, according to polls, of support of 40 percent of the electorate.

Leaders of the movement said that, if the Patriotic Camp—the Christian National Union [ZChN], the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR], and other right-wing parties—are able to form an alliance, the new movement would only deal with the organization of the campaign.

If no agreement is reached, the movement will run the campaign on its own.

Jerzy Gwizdz was elected chairman of the movement.

Lech Walesa has today begun his trip to Denmark and Sweden.

Slovenia: Weekly Analyzes Closer SKD, LDS Ties

AU0503151896 Ljubljana MAG in Slovene
28 Feb 96 pp 20, 21

[Article by Janez Markes: "Coalition Against the Spring"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Just as last year at the meeting under the Najevska lipa [oldest linden tree in Slovenia], I am again supporting a coalition of reason. The approach toward European integration and...how we will tailor our future...depends...on the strength of such a coalition." (Milan Kucan in the State Chamber 20 April 94)

The link stayed the same. Regardless of whether President Kucan had a greater coalition or just any coalition in mind in parliament in 1994, the statement successfully shows Slovenia's political path in the last four years: starting with group enthusiasm about great tales (Najevska lipa), through the strength of "such" a coalition, to the question of tailoring our future.

However, the present is approximately such: it seems that the battle between LDS [Liberal Democracy of Slovenia] and the ZLSD [United List of Social Democrats] was won by the former, as the latter failed to destabilize the government. The functioning of the government is therefore guaranteed by the extensive cooperation of the SKD [Slovene Christian Democrats]. This does not mean, though, that [Prime Minister] Drnovsek's team will win the war. The elections will portray a more realistic picture. Research shows that both parties will be weakened. Apparently ZLSD regret their separation from the coalition, as this may clarify the party's connection with its not so distant symbols.

How did LDS manage to win over the Christian Democrats, despite the unique opportunity for early elections? The key to this may be found in the personnel policy, the greatest reproach against Drnovsek a few months ago. One must remember Drnovsek's television appearance last December, when he said that "talks with SKD, that is, their leader, are often reduced only to the issue of who will get what position.... Due to this, almost every topical talk with them usually ends up with personnel trading." Drnovsek's rejection was the answer to the SKD's demand for early elections. Their slogan at that time was Slovenia onward with early elections. Chairman Lojze Peterle then wrote: "The SKD has, over the few years of governmental responsibility, never used questionable political tricks, which would bring it easy political points." The suggestion for early elections was then also criticized by the ZLSD.

Again Personnel Solutions

Prime Minister Drnovsek has now, in a tighter political area, offered SKD trading with personnel solutions, which he had previously condemned. At least that is what can be concluded from the press conferences of Gregor Golobic and Hilda Tovsak, general secretaries of the party, this week. The relationship between both coalition parties is to be taken care of by an annex, which is also supposed to "define personnel solutions." This is the second time Drnovsek has broken his promise with such political inconsistency. He did the same with the TAM [Maribor truck manufacturer] issue, when he said that the money the parliament had set aside for TAM's financial rehabilitation would be the last money that TAM would receive. A couple of weeks later he boasted the fact that he personally intervened with the banks regarding wage money. However, this was not our prime minister's last political tautology.

Everyone can recall the government's declarative anticorruption attitude ever since the elections in 1992. Whenever a minister was changed, one would always hear guarantees relating to the immaculateness of the position. Let us remind ourselves of the discussions regarding the judicature at the time when the legislature giving the government authority over the prosecutor was being altered. This was done under the pretense of increasing the legal state's effectiveness. That same week, Drnovsek met with State Prosecutor Anton Drobnic, as well as with three ministers: Zupancic, Janko, and Ster. The reason was because supposedly "in that period" there had been numerous accusations against the judicature, which in turn brought doubts into the functioning of judiciary system and threaten the "credibility of the state." The prosecutor and the ministers apparently evaluated the functioning of the government in the area of fighting crime as positive. Phrases mentioning the continuation of the government's actions were followed with the promise that the government will, for that purpose, soon prepare suggestions for the alteration of the appropriate legislature. This would then simplify criminal proceedings and alleviate the work of the prosecution and courts.... When someone says they will soon meet the needs for the functioning of a legal state at the end of a four-year term, therefore directly before the elections, it is not merely a hidden confession of having done nothing so far, but also rude political cynicism and arrogance.

This nevertheless means that Drnovsek has judged that he must somehow talk about these issues and move to the second phase — from permitting wild west-type laws during the time of transition, to moving away from such actions in the manner suggesting immaculateness, unawareness, and non-involvement. In this, Drnovsek vitally needs a (coalition) partner, as it is necessary to blur the clarity, to mix "the old and the new," and ZLSD's separation from the coalition eases the way for both LDS as well as SKD.

Spring Challenge

Although the SKD-LDS axis has been hardened, the opposition parties, SLS [Slovene People's Party] and SDSS [Social Democratic Party of Slovenia], as well as other smaller parties, have not given up their desire to form a kind of spring union of parties, which would include SKD. Drnovsek personally tried to weaken this association even before ZLSD had left the coalition, by inviting chairmen and members of both opposition parties to constructively cooperate with the government regarding "matters of national importance." These are foreign policy matters. Representatives of the SLS did visit him, whereas Jansa's Social Democrats tactically rejected this maneuver. Drnovsek has weakened the entire matter from the other side. He turned the SKD, the former candidate for the opposition, against the potential associates from the opposition (candidates to join the government). He succeeded in this, which means that the idea of a Slovene spring has died away and become unrealistic. The elections, as unpredictable as they can be, will therefore have to include an alternative, which has not yet been formed — it will not be possible for the founders of the so-called Slovene spring from the late eighties to reconcile to the fact the currently established situation is the final state of a mature community. How our future will be tailored should not, as many say, depend upon the strength of such a coalition.

Slovenia: Financing of 1996 Military Projects Suspended

AU0603192396 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
1 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by Vladimir Vodusek: "Insufficient Funds Even for Basic Development Programs"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana, 29 February — Following the problems with the purchase of the military communications equipment in Israel, new problems have also emerged in the implementation of the basic development programs on "the relations" between the Finance Ministry and the Defense Ministry. Namely, a letter by Finance Ministry State Secretary Andrej Engelman, which he addressed to the Defense Ministry, claims that it is not possible to finance these programs in 1996.

Namely, the Defense Ministry has not yet even drafted a plan for basic development programs for 1996, which should initially be compiled by a government commission and subsequently proposed to the government for adoption. On 15 February the ministry only dispatched a new, altered demand to the Finance Ministry requesting funds for January and February and a report on the funds planned and spent, which was not harmonized with the demand for the two months in question.

In connection with all this, the Finance Ministry concludes that not all the conditions for the financing of the fundamental development programs in 1996 have been fulfilled. We must emphasize that the above does not merely represent a violation of the formal procedures in the absence of the plan for the implementation of the basic development programs. The Finance Ministry is unable to ensure in a timely fashion the relevant credit arrangements either for the already agreed contractual obligations or for obligations from contracts that are still in the making. [passage omitted]

The Finance Ministry has on several occasions warned the Defense Ministry that the financing of the basic programs and the signing of new contracts would not be possible without an appropriate plan for implementing the basic development programs for 1996. In January the ministry received a Defense Ministry request for the funds to settle the obligations undertaken in 1995 and in January and February 1996. At the same time, the Finance Ministry also received written assurances that the basic development program for 1996 was at the coordination phase in the Defense Ministry and would in the shortest possible time be forwarded to the government. On the basis of this demand, which was treated as a cashflow plan to implement the basic development program for 1995 in 1996, the treasury sector drew up a plan to finance it with credit from the Bayerische Landersbank, which was with the government's decision also intended for it.

This secured the funds for the obligations that the Defense Ministry's letter envisaged until the end of February; of course, all this on condition that the coordinated plan for 1996 provides the relevant information for the forthcoming period and is also approved by the government, State Secretary Engelman writes in a reply to the Defense Ministry.

Federal

Federal: Commission Satisfied With Cooperation With IFOR

AU0603165496 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The FRY Government Committee for cooperation with the UN peace forces and the Implementation Force [IFOR] debated at today's session, chaired by committee chairman Radoje Kontic, the current issues concerning the realization of the agreement between the FRY and NATO on the transit arrangements for the implementation of the peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It was assessed that the cooperation so far with the international forces for the implementation of the peace plan, which transited through the territory of the FRY, was good and that the FRY relevant authorities were meeting their obligations from Dayton. The session accepted the foundations for concluding special arrangements with IFOR representatives to regulate more clearly certain spheres of cooperation, that is, certain stipulations from the transit agreement. The session adopted concrete tasks from the committee's current activities.

Federal: FRY-Macedonia Talks Stumble on Succession Rights

AU0703130096 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 6 Mar 96 p 7

[Unattributed report: "Mutual Recognition of Belgrade and Skopje Postponed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The foreign ministers of the FRY and Macedonia [FYROM, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], Milan Milutinovic and Ljubomir Frcovski respectively, have again discussed by telephone the normalization of relations between the two states, the Skopje-based TV station A1 reports.

Citing diplomatic sources, the station claims that on this occasion the Yugoslav side demanded that a sentence be added to the prepared text of the decision on normalization of relations that there are no unresolved questions between the two states, which would mean that neither owes the other anything. The Macedonian side's response was that Macedonia cannot accept such a modification, and it is prepared to sign a text in which the matters of succession to the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia's property are described as frozen. According to explanations heard in Skopje, the matter of succession rights would be resolved within the group in charge of succession matters with the Conference on former Yugoslavia, and through international institutions.

According to sources at the Macedonian Foreign Ministry, it is uncertain whether the mutual recognition between Belgrade and Skoplje will take place this week.

After last week's telephone conversation between Milutinovic and Frckovski, it was agreed that the FRY and Macedonia recognize each other on 6 or 7 March.

Federal: Article Speculates on Avramovic's Departure

96BA0164E Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 96 p 10

[Article by V.S.: "Parting of the Ways"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is every indication that the new year, 1996, will not be in the spirit of Dragoslav Avramovic, the popular governor of the central bank. That is, neither a year of stabilization, nor a year with more or less sound money. The super-grandfather and his super-dinar lasted two summers, just as long and no longer than was necessary for those who really make the decisions in this country. A dangerous period for staying in power was survived, and now, after Dayton, it is possible to breathe more easily. The services of an elderly, but exceptionally vigorous and in many respects modern, governor—simply are no longer necessary.

There is, of course, no direct evidence to support this kind of forecast: The campaign for public support of Program 2, designed by Avramovic, is under way, and the lower-level political echelon is using it to practice the important discipline of "following orders," and the journalists of the controlled media are earning their salaries. No one here has been so naive, for a long time, as to draw conclusions on the basis of what is said in public. Reading between the lines is a national trait carefully nurtured over decades. So now, by applying the methodology customary in this region, we easily arrive at the following relevant facts.

Because of the insincere and carelessly conducted liberalization of imports, the opening up of the domestic economy to world competition has remained at the level of declarative support, and even that has contained many conditions and reservations. That has broken the back of Program 2, without giving it a chance to take even the first step. The adoption of budgets, which are profoundly inflationary, regardless of what is said by those who devise them, is like the icing on the cake in this whole business. Reelection of the people whom Dragoslav Avramovic, before he went to the hospital, accused of being the principal opponents of his conception for the domestic economy to emerge from the recession can be seen as the decoration to top off that icing.

In other words, regardless of speculation in the newspapers regarding whether or not the governor will return to his office in the central bank following his hospital recovery, it is clear even now that Dragoslav Avramovic has been "spent up" like many previous reformers. The maneuvering space for his Program 2, which is essentially much more radical and appropriate to a modern market economy than the previous Program for Monetary Reconstruction, glorified by the media, has been narrowed to an absurd extent. In that context, it does not matter whether the governor parts company with his principal employer quietly and without a public outburst (if necessary, even in the post of the top man in the National Bank of Yugoslavia), or the parting of the ways is somewhat noisier.

Avramovic said prophetically in an informal conversation that the job which he began with Program 2 will have to be done whether he or someone else is the "doer." At this moment, it is certain that the issue has been postponed with no precise calculation as to what the price of that delay might be to the nation. It is likely that the bill will be presented at the end of 1996 in terms of the further decline of all performances of the domestic economy.

Federal: Yugoslavia Takes 'Civilized Step,' Joins Internet

96BA0164B Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Jan 96 p 16

[Article by Z. Mihic: "Internet-Yugoslavia: Information Without a Monopoly"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The news of last week that the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] is joining the global network Internet marked yet another civilized step for this country. After five years of total blackout for this region, the FRY's computer address becomes visible on the screens of about 100 million Internet users all over the world, and by the same token they all become accessible to us for interactive communication.

And the English word "provider" actually was uttered in public for the first time on the domestic information services market last week; this is a firm which provides, facilitates, and supplies computer users with full service and all available services of the Internet world network. Although officially the first such firm in our country is BK MR Systems Company (a member of the Braca Karic system), there is no doubt that soon there will be quite a jam in offering this service in Belgrade and other principal communication junctions in the FRY. What is more, the conception for expansion and development of the Internet is antimonopolistic by nature, and calls for a maximum number of "providers" in local networks, which is why the growth rate of new users in this network has achieved an incredible 10 percent per month.

Factor in Development

In present-day informatics societies, connection to the Internet cannot be compared to the everyday symbols of our standard of living, such as running water, electricity, telephone, or television. The conventional media have become too small for a real insight into the trends of world development, and that is why the Internet, that immense structure embracing 50,000 smaller computer networks over the entire planet, has become a treasury of knowledge and a development resource of the modern world.

The FRY's contacts with the Internet were actually never altogether severed. Even during the war and the sanctions, the so-called Academy Network (System for Scientific-Technical Information of Serbia—SNTIS) was connected to the Internet through a provider in Greece, but that connection was occasional, and it involved so-called e-mail (electronic mail) services, which is only one of a dozen or so capabilities of this network.

Today, full Internet service affords a search of all accessible data bases in the world, file transfer, the exchange of electronic documents, conference linkup, multimedia transmission, and "on-line" connection and computer-computer connection from the most diverse points on the planet.

At a news conference held in the federal government last week, it was announced that about $200,000 had been allocated from the FRY budget for full connection of the academy network to the Internet system. However, the need for other users (federal authorities, for example) to connect is becoming greater and greater every day.

According to estimates of the informatics situation in our country, there ought to be about 200,000 computers in the FRY, mainly private and personal property. The sanctions made quite a mess here, especially in the computerization of enterprises, because they made equipment inaccessible and excessively expensive (from 40 to 100 percent more expensive than the price abroad). After a certain boom of individuals buying personal computers (about 40,000 PC's were sold two years ago in the FRY), last year an appreciable drop and consolidation was recorded in private purchases of this equipment.

According to figures presented by Nikola Markovic, director of the Federal Bureau of Informatics, there are 60 personal computers per 100 employees in the United

States. In Europe, that average is 22 PC's, and in France there is one PC for every two university students. In the FRY, according to the most recent data, about 60,000 employees use information equipment, which, if divided by the total number of employees, means that three out of every 100 employed has a PC.

The Karices and B-92

Although our people are generally interested in these electronic machine tools, the effect of this country's isolation from world networks such as the Internet has been disastrous for the domestic informatics intelligentsia. Utterly "invisible" to all world users of this network, without a single communication node in the country, we have remained at the level of a tribal African state in which there are no computers and no inhabitants who are computer-literate. For all those reasons, connection to the Internet can be compared by domestic standards, without any euphoria, with our return to the civilization of the contemporary world on the threshold of the 21st century.

It was by no means an accident that the first news of our connection to the Internet was announced last week by the provider firm BK MR Systems (a subsidiary of the Braca Karic firm). This firm has already obtained 60 free PTT lines for their center in Belgrade, and also quality ground and satellite connections with the EU-net in Amsterdam. This provider will offer full Internet service for individuals, internal networks, and business networks (firms and enterprises) at differing rates.

As Radoslav Stankovic, M.A., director of BK MR Systems, announced at their press conference, the commercial prices of their services will apply mainly to the business network, while individuals and the academy network will be a privileged target group. In the European countries, the typical rate for individual Internet users ranges from 10 to 30 German marks a month for an average of 10 hours of operation in the network. Following trial operation in January, connection to the Internet through this provider will begin, for all practical purposes, in the first days of February.

Belgrade's inclusion in full and permanent Internet service actually began back in November through the B-92 Internet Center of the radio station of the same name in Belgrade. But these firms have different conceptions of the business operation. That is, the target groups of the provider at B-92 are the independent media, schoolchildren, university students, nongovernmental organizations, and scientific institutions. At their headquarters in the Youth Center in Belgrade, they are right now finishing a classroom that is equipped for training on the Internet, which will mainly be used by schoolchildren, and this will be free.

"During the first year, we will work on education and on equipping this center. We are a nonprofit organization, and our provider in Amsterdam, Mr. Felipe Rodrugez, is the largest private provider in Holland. At the moment, we have between 50 and 100 users of our center and one 2,400-kilobyte line for Holland, which is sufficient for our capacity," says Drazen Pantic, assistant professor in the School of Mathematics of Belgrade University, and director of this center, which is being equipped with help from the Soros Foundation. "Our biggest problem now has to do with obtaining new telephone connections from the PTT in Belgrade, because we have only one connection, and that is not enough."

At the present moment, several other firms are competing to provide Internet service in the FRY, and it is expected that there will be a dozen or so by the end of the year. None of them disputes the need for an antimonopoly position for further development of the Internet in the FRY, but the monopoly role of PTT Srbije in allocating new telephone connections will undoubtedly be a big problem. On the Internet, however, they do not tolerate monopolies, and as soon as that kind of behavior is spotted, it is clear what will follow—more sanctions.

Serbia

Serbia: Opposition Ready To Ignore Possible Ban of Rally

AU0603164096 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Mar 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "We Shall Not Comply With a Chinese-Style Decision"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade—"We have notified the authorities about the rally planned to take place at Republic Square on 9 March, so its possible ban would be an even stronger invitation to hold it," leader of the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] Vuk Draskovic stated. "The possible ban would be an unconstitutional, Chinese-style decision which we, as long as we are in Europe, will not comply with," Draskovic said at yesterday's news conference. [passage omitted]

Serbia: DS Leader Invites Opposition To Unite

AU0503205596 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Mar 96 p 13

[Interview with Vojislav Kostunica, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia, by Marija Brkic; place and date not given: "It Is Time for Demonstrations"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Brkic] The opposition made efforts to unite both in 1990 and 1992, but somehow everything fell apart before it was even composed. Even now, as joint action is being discussed, an open quarrel between the SRS [Serbian Radical Party] and the SPS [Serbian Socialist Party] is going on, while your relations with the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] are no better as well. In view of this, how utopian is the idea of unification?

[Kostunica] I do not know whether it is utopian or not, but I think this is the moment when the elections in 1996 are much more important than those in 1990. I think those who do not accept this idea will have to assume a great responsibility. We have to find out who wants unification, and who does not. Or, to put it more precisely, who dares and who does not. I think the problem is more likely to be in the latter, who dares to unite with whom. The regime has considerably influenced this story of ours, but also some other outside factors. For us this question is totally irrelevant, in view of our goal we want to achieve. Everybody who thinks "I cannot do this or that because Dedinje [district where Milosevic resides] or Washington tells me so" simply works to make it possible for those in Dedinje to strengthen their positions. This is a very dangerous thing to do. [passage omitted]

[Brkic] Still, it appears that the story about the unification of the opposition has already been buried once. Is this its irrational resurrection, or simply a consequence of reality?

[Kostunica] The very facts that all this evil spread throughout former Yugoslavia, that the war is drawing to a close, that it is more than clear how impossible it is to cause any changes from inside without deposing the current regime, that the regime is still functional and needed by the outside factor in the implementation of the Dayton accords, are the reasons requiring our joint action. Therefore, this is not a utopian goal, this is not a chimera.

[Brkic] If one speaks of the opposition's joint performance, why will the Democratic Party not appear at the commemoration of 9 March?

[Kostunica] The preparations for 9 March 1996 have not been started by the opposition jointly, so consequently its members cannot part ways. The first time the commemoration of 9 March was mentioned the Democratic Party stressed its positive attitude toward the event, but the question is how it should be commemorated in view of the current circumstances.

March, just like February, will pass marked by a wave of Serb refugees from Sarajevo. Sarajevo comes after western Slavonia, Serb Krajina, western Bosnia, forgotten Mostar, and before eastern Slavonia, with the indifference not only on the part of the regime, but also on the part of the international community, which is even worse.

One cannot organize a big rally to pass over it, or to hush it up. The impression is that one is avoiding facing the circumstances as they are, and the regime as it is. The Democratic Party is awaiting 9 March with a leaflet carrying the following message: "Until the tyranny in Serbia tumbles down, let every day be 9 March." A very simple message that suggests the need for taking action against the regime on a daily basis, and primarily in the sphere where the opposition parties and democracy in Serbia have been put at greatest disadvantage, which is the media.

What connects 9 March in 1996 with the one in 1991 is the situation in the media, which is far worse than it was in 1991. Even today, I remember quite well a formulation in a newspaper report, according to which the demonstrations came about because of the partisan blindness of the state-run television. If that was an example of partisan blindness, then today we can speak in terms of total blindness.

Studio B, which used to represent a weak alternative to the state-run television, but also a media freedom at least to a degree, no longer exists. Are we ready to fight for Studio B? We are. I am afraid, however, that a great part of the opposition is not. The Democratic Party has shown that it can do so without a large rally boycotting the new, state-run Studio B. Other parties, although they made promises of that kind, have not kept them. Thus they have in a way legitimized the violence done by the regime. So, no matter what we choose, a national event or an internal political one, on 9 March one should react differently. We believe the time has come for demonstrations, rather than for commemoration. That is, for our acting like an opposition, and not for celebrations.

[Brkic] Will you organize soon some demonstrations?

[Kostunica] Yes, we are considering that possibility. There will certainly be joint rallies by opposition parties. We shall address our messages to the regime, because there is no need for us to address them to anyone else, or to promote our platforms, said to be nonexistent by the regime, at such rallies.

We have a platform, void of any major difference between individual opposition parties. In all major issues, when speaking of media openness, privatization, or parliamentary life, we have a completely different attitude from the regime. It is as different as heaven and earth. However, we do not need to promote our platform at any rally. We simply need to demonstrate that we disagree with attitudes held by the regime. [passage omitted]

[Box, p 13]

[Kostunica] Cooperation with the regime is possible after a defeat in elections. Once they are defeated, the communists are no longer the same. They change their nature, and adjust it to new circumstances. This means that the socialists must suffer a defeat once.

Serbia: Commentary Calls SPS 'Insignificant'

AU0603074796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Mar 96 p 8

[Commentary by Ivan Radovanovic: "The Leader and the Escorts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The last step toward what one of the Serbian politicians called the transformation of the Socialist Party of Serbia into a sort of a socialist alliance was made in the Sava Center on 2 March. By changing two-thirds of his own party's leadership, Slobodan Milosevic has in fact demonstrated how insignificant that party is.

It turned out that the only task of the well-trained socialists who, at his whistle, came running to the Third SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] Congress, was to proclaim him the great leader almost by acclamation. In return, one distributed to them pieces of meat and beer that they drank out of bottles.

As for deciding who will be what in the Socialist Party, not only could they not vote on that, but they were forbidden even to think about it. A party congress at which not a single debate (real discussion) was registered also confirms the thesis from the beginning of this text—the party is, in fact, insignificant.

In that party, members do not make decisions, but implement goals set to them, and the party itself does not rule, but implements the will of others. As for those who thought differently, Milosevic calmly removed them. The Socialist Party of Serbia is formally in power, and that power has recently been calmly taken away by another party that does not have a single deputy in the Republic and Federation assemblies and is taking away that power as much as it choses to. Something of this kind could never happen to a serious and significant party, but can happen to the socialist alliance any time.

The broadest (socialist and leftist) front will in the future have the task and all necessary instruments to make itself more numerous, to get into all cracks and crevices of "the social life," to link up workers and pensioners, farmers and militiamen, university professors and soldiers, that is, in a word, to create a huge body of grass roots and to stop just there. As for power, it is meant for somebody else.

It is meant for Slobodan Milosevic himself, Mira Markovic herself, and the escorts handpicked by them. These escorts will essentially be insignificant, deprived of power, and will depend on the sheer power of their master. He will be able to replace them whenever he wishes to.

This is probably the only significance that Milosevic attributed to his socialist alliance embodied in the Socialist Party. With its blind, deaf, and mute members, this party in fact helps to make everybody but him easily replaceable. For instance, not a single one of 1,799 Third Congress delegates said a single word against the replacement of Goran Percevic, until recently influential and beloved, from the post of party deputy chairman.

This was not only because they were not asked, but because they did not really care. They have given power to somebody else of their own will anyway. They had come to the Sava Center for the piece of cake that the ruler threw them from the table.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Kilibarda Warns of Rally Against Media Blockade

AU0603163096 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Mar 96 p 4

[Report by B.I. Milicevic: "Kilibarda: Milosevic Has No Mandate for Prevlaka"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica—"In Montenegro conditions are getting ripe for a major opposition rally against the media blockade. Of course, like the ruling party, we are not very fond of rallies, so for the time being we are just warning of that possibility," Novak Kilibarda pointed out at yesterday's news conference by the People's Party of Montenegro, adding that the DPS [Democratic Party of Socialists] is obliged to provide information to the opposition parties' voters on what their parties think about certain social problems.

"We are now in election year and the DPS has obviously begun applying total pressure, eliminating even the last hope that in Montenegro there may be even the slightest sign of the freedom of the press, being an essential condition of democracy," Zelimir Nikcevic, spokesman of the People's Party, said, claiming that the current situation in the state-run media is disastrous. Nikcevic added that the Montenegrin state-run media have been behaving as though spellbound or hypnotized by the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] Congress over recent days. "We are simply being swamped with reports and information on this historic event and we have heard a lot of phrases and promises from the SPS's inspired leftist speakers from the smallest Serbian municipalities, whereas the Montenegrin opposition is not entitled to an elementary right to state three or four sentences of its own in those media," Nikcevic complains. Speaking of Prevlaka [disputed peninsular on the Croatian-Montenegrin border], the chairman of the People's Party pointed out that Milosevic does not have a mandate to settle the issue of Prevlaka. According to him, Prevlaka is a matter of vital interest for the FRY and Montenegro. "We do not object to the right given to the president of Serbia to settle the issue of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but we are interested to know whether or not, when speaking of Prevlaka, Milosevic is an interpreter of the will of President Bulatovic," Kilibarda said, demanding that the Montenegrin president appear in the Republican Assembly to explain to people how negotiations about Prevlaka are developing.

"All the moves made by the authorities in Montenegro regarding Prevlaka have so far been wrong," the leader of the People's Party stressed, convinced that the entire opposition will be unified in demanding that there be an assembly debate on this problem. "In Croatia, the issue of Prevlaka has been elevated to a high level, so decisions on it will be made through a referendum, taking account of the people's will, so for that reason we are demanding that the Montenegrin authorities allow an assembly debate on Prevlaka. I think that we shall find out through that debate what Milosevic has agreed to in Rome about the peninsular, as well as some other details," Kilibarda said.

Kosovo

Kosovo: FRY Minister on Problems of Ethnic Albanians

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 5 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Interior Minister Vukasin Jokanovic said there could be no negotiations with representatives of ethnic Albanians in Serbia's southern province of Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet), only talks on overcoming existing problems.

Speaking to a reporter of the periodical INTERVJU, Jokanovic said problems of ethnic Albanians could be resolved "within Serbia and with respect for civic equality and the highest standards of rights of ethnic communities, along the lines of international documents."

He said there was especially "room for talks to continue on questions pertaining to education, culture, health, information, and other problems."

Jokanovic said talks should take place with those ethnic Albanian representatives who were ready to abandon the nationalistic euphoria and the target of a so-called republic of Kosovo, and who wished to live in peace and equality.

Jokanovic said the current leaders were prisoners of the unrealistic promises they had given to their fellow ethnic Albanians.

There is a "large number of people (in Kosmet) who are now politically passive, aware of the reality and the mistakes of their current leaders." These people will be an important factor in Kosmet in the times to come, Jokanovic told INTERVJU.

Speaking about the constitutional changes of 1989, Jokanovic, Kosmet assembly speaker at the time, said they had been made legally, in agreement with constitutional procedures and the will of the vast majority of delegates.

He pointed out that there had been an entire scenario at the time for clashes and bloodshed to begin in Kosmet, "supported in an organized manner by the leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia, so that they could more easily realize their secessions."

Under the 1974 constitution of the former Yugoslav federation, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia's both provinces - Kosmet and Vojvodina, had had state authorities, breaking down Serbia's sovereignty over its integral territory.

A strong separatist movement of ethnic Albanians has been active in Kosmet for decades, which has proclaimed a so-called republic of Kosovo and urges Kosmet's secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia and its annexation to Albania.

Ethnic Albanians account for about 82 percent of the total population of more than 950,000 inhabitants of Kosmet.

Jokanovic said the stand of all key international factors that the problem of Kosmet can be resolved only within Serbia and Yugoslavia has made the seccesionists nervous and caused some of them now to "advocate radical oethods and change the type of struggle."

"Now is the time for reasonable people who will know how and will be able to organize joint political life to overcome and enter the stage," Jokanovic said.

Commenting on opinions which are occasionally heard that Yugoslavia will yield under pressure of the big powers, Jokanovic said Yugoslavia could not give in when its territorial integrity was concerned, because it was a "question of survival of both the people and the state."

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